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OT 1971

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
Cert to CA9(Browning, Carter, Trask).-Per Curiam
Browning dissenting.
Petr was stopped by a rovrung
from the Mexican border

m~xt~e

u.s.

border patro~oming

into California. The officers

has stopped petr's car for the specific purpose of checking i
for aliens. When the miiigxz officers checked the car4of petr;
it showed he was a resident alien of the United States. At that
point, one of the officers looked under the ::aP

-------

::at~ t~e

¥R~ig

vehicle for aliens. Although the officer himself had never found
aliens under the t rear seat of

t~ex¥e~igie

autos, he had heard

of it being done. Moreover, just prior to this, there had been
an information bulletin from the headquarters of the Border PAtrol
advising them that alien

sm~~i

smugglers has developed a practice

whereby the illegal aliens would sit up behind the back seatp
with their legs folded under the zz rear seat cushion whose

springs had been removed. Under the rear seat, the officer

'\

discovered packages

wxa~~a~xi

containing marijuana¥ which led

to petr's conviction.
Petrs contention is that the marijuana
discovered should have been

SM~xxas

s~

t~i

thus

~i

suppressed at txai trial

and not admitted into evidence¥ on the ground that probable E
cause-- admittedly absent here-- was required for the search.

-->

However, under 8

u.s.c.

1357(a)(3) immigration

~ficers

have

the power to conduct a warrantless search of vehicles within
100 air miles of any external boundary, and probable
not required for such a search. The

~xi~Ei~aki

is

caus~

principal limitation

---

upon the scope of such a search is that the Border Patrol may not
search places in which no person
i

i~a

co~ld

hide.

Given these ground rules, the search in question

seems reasonable here. The search was made within 50 miles of the
Mexican border and was conducted for the express purpose of
~

discovering aliens. Based on the information available to the
officer, trn
conceiva~ly

search was conducted in a place where aliens couldt
be expected to hideo

The only remaining question therefore is whether, as the
dissent argues, the federal statute and the implememting
regulations permitting this kind of border search are

-

ia~isiatiEn

EB~stitMiE~ai

unconstitutionalo The circuit court decisions interpreting this
'

statute have generally upheld it on the

~XiM~

grounds that it

represents congressional recognition im of the right of the United
States to protect its own boundaries against ta the illegal

im~Exta

importation of alienso I t~im am firmly of the belief that dep~ures
from

ixB~

normal probable_sause and warrant requirements are

permissib~where

~axmissi

something so essential to govto's right to keep

unauthorized aliens out of the country is involved. For this reason
I would affirm the majority below and
DENY
JHW

d
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cuss

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
An affidavit has been submitted by Mr. ~sm James Chanoux
ft"A.."+: c:- e..
who isxam has been admitted to pss ·' ; e kleii~: before this Court
and has represented petr in the

gB

proceedings below. Petr has

requested he be his appointed counsel for the proceedings here. Petr
iag~

lacks funds for the hiring of counsel. I would grant this motion

for the appointment of Mr.
GRANT

.•.

~a~

Chanoux
JHW

~unsel.

LAH 3/19/73
Notes re United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, No. 71-6278
(1)

Factual considerations:

a. major

~-~

~l:;t·~tQ'lth

The stop occurred north of

artery (Hy 80, which runs from Tuscon,

through Yuma and El Centro, to San Diego).

The stop was

executed on Hy 78, a Hy that does not run into Mexico at
all.

~·~

Indeed, it is a-rReFt:h seut+J. rode itself.
The car in this case had not crossed the border but

had been picked up in Calexico.
(2)

Major cases:
(a)

Camara & See~-building inspections in search of

code violations are permissible without probable cause to
believe that any particular dwelling is in violation
where (1) an area search is reasonable in light of overall conditions in that area 9 and (2) there is a warrant ..
(b)

Colonnade & Biswell--limited searches of liquor

and firearm's establishments are permissible without a
warrant.

Empahsis in these cases on the historic regula-

bility of the subject matter and the reduced expectation of
privacy.
(3)

Analysis
I would agree with the suspension of the warrant clause,

---------

on the basis of other automobile search cases.
suspend the requirement of probable cause?

But, why

Surely the

requirement can be suspended at the border, since the
Government has an interest in maintaining the security of
the borders and since, like

d~in

the case of a firearm

dealer's license, one sacrifices his reasonable expectation

l/

.'

-

of privacy when he desires to enter the country •. But, how
~

is that principle to extend to the search of a car that did

--2.-. ...

~.,~

--------------------

not cross the border on a road north of a major

pgrth?iQ~~h

intersection?

I would require, first, that the Border Patrol have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle crossed t e
border.
----........,

This could be based on (1) presence at the border;

(2) presence on a north-south road running from the border
to some

interse~tion

of significant size; or (3) continued

surveillance or other radiod notice of border-crossing.

If

this requirement is met then the Border Patrol might conduct
a routine alien search.
border search.

This is a mere extension of the

This requirement would require reversal of

the instant case.
Now 9 second, what standard should govern stops and
searches in circumstances where there is no probable cause
to believe that the car has crossed the border?

Here we

might distinguish between the stop and the search.

The

stop could be based on reasonable suspicion under Terry
and Adams.

Motorists could be stopped where an experienced

Patrolman has

reas~n

to believe short of probable cause

that he crossed the border.
ing could be acceptable and a

A brief detemtion for questionsubsequen~

search could be

justified if the officers learn that the car has crossed
the border (here probable cause might be gained from
the motoristvs own mouth).

,"/- .
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CHAMISE:AS

o.-

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 11, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~rtutt

Qfll'lttt ttf tqt 'Jllttift~ ~hUts

..N.lllthtgttttt. ~.
CHAMBERS OF"

<!f.

2ll'.;t't.$

.

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 12, 197 3

Re:

No. 71-6278 -

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

;/Ct.6.
Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference

.iuprnu:t ~ou.rt of t4t ~nittlt ,jtaftg
~att4ington.l8. ~ 20.;t'!-~

CHAMBEriS OF

.JuSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v United States
0

In due course I plan to circulate a dissenting
opinion in this case

o

(}(·

\/
Po So

I

/

·1

.iu:prtntt Q}onrt cf tqt Pttittb $5hdts
'Diaslrmgtcn. 111. Q}. 2!l.;t~;t
CHAMBERS OF"

April 19, 197 3

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U. S.

Dear Byron:
I shall await Potter's dissent
before voting on this one.
Sincerely,

iT.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

Conference

T

..

•'

.iuvuntt <q:on.rt of t4e 1ffttite~ ~tntcg
Jras1Titl!lton. gl. QJ. 20&1'!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, .JR.

May 3, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion
in the above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference

/

,iiu:puntt QJcurt cf tqt 'J!htittb ~taftg

11Jagfringtcn, ~. QJ. 2ll,?J!.;l
CHAMBERS OF"

May 3, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

/

Re: . No. 11-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

L

T.M.

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

Conference

'•

j;141rtmt <!fonrt of tltt ~ttiitlt .$tatts

J}asqmgton. ~.

<q.

21lgiJ!.~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

May

4, 1973

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissent in

71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.

William

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc:

•,

'

The Conference

o.

Douglas

~~ F.tmt ~o:ud cf tqt ~ttb' ~ta:ftg
'J:l.laglrhtght~
<!}. 2 giJLt;}

tB.

CHAMBERS Of'

T HE CHIEF" JUSTICE

May 9, 1973

...
Re:

No. 71-6278 - Condrado Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States

Dear Byron:
With your leave I may add a few inconsequential
comments, concurring, along the following lines :
I join fully in the Court's opinion, but it may be useful
to note that the scope of the Court's holding today does not begin
to approach the sweeping dimensions attributed to it by the dissent .
Regulations must , of necessity , often be cast in general terms, cf.
Mourning v. Family ,
U.S .
(dec. 5 / __ / 73 ). Indeed,
this is so of the Constitution in many of its provisions. The Fourth
Amendment itself uses general terms in adopting ''reasonableness"
as its test. Reasonably regarded, the regulation in question here
was obviously made to reach the problems described by Mr . Justice
White in relation to borders which extend thousands of miles through
trackless forests or, as here, literally uninhabited desert space; the
government disclaims any purpose of applying them in inhabited areas.
The framers of the Fourth Amendment were farsighted and
perceptive enough to speak in common sense terms that could be
applied to a wide variety of particular situations . An extended search
of the kind contested here could not survive the test of "reasonableness"
if it took place in Boston, New York, or Washington, although these
cities are within 20 miles of a sea border. To speculate that the
Court's holding will open the door to wholesale stopping of cars within
a range of 100 miles from every border and port of entry is idle
hyperbole. It is the extensive , sparsely settled border lands to the
north and south of the United States that are particularly susceptible

- 2 -

to the widespread alien smuggling alluded to in the Court's
opinion and which require the extended border searches whose
reasonableness is today sustained. I._/ To posit a "parade of
horribles," such as sweeping searches in a large border city -El Paso, Texas, for example -- is to assume that federal judges
will overlook what Mr. Justice Black said so often, that "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment, means "reasonable" under all the
circumstances --time, place, setting and surroundings. In the
words of Mr. Justice Black:
Our Government is founded upon a written
Constitution. The draftsmen expressed themselves
in careful and measured terms corresponding with
the immense importance of the powers delegated to
them. The Framers of the Constitution, and the
people who adopted it, must be understood to have
used words in their natural meaning , and to have
intended what they said .
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require
that every search be made pursuant to a warrant .
It prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures . 11
The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the
opportunity to procure a warrant , but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances .
The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se
rules ; each case must be decided o n its facts . Coolidge
v . New Hampshire, 403 U . S . 443 , 500, 509 - 510 .
(Concurring and dissenting o pinion) (19 7 1) .
It may be that your contemplated revisions or Potter's, if he
chooses to respond, will render my c omments totally superfluous .
Regards ,

Mr . Justice White
Copies to the Conference

]j
We can judicially notice, from the reported cases in the federal
courts, the extraordinary ingenuity - - and cruelty -- of the devices
used to smuggle aliens in empty border regions , including concealing
then1 in the franJ.es, tanks, and under tho hoods of car a.

»u: r..:uu ~lt.Uli of t4t
1fag1ytnghtn. ~. <!}.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

May 9, 1973

No. 71-6278 - Condrado Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States

Dear Byron:
With your leave I may add a few inconsequential
comments, concurring, along the following lines:
I join fully in the Court 1 s opinion, but it may be useful
to note that the scope of the Court 1 s holding today does not begin
to approach the sweeping dimensions attributed to it by the dissent.
Re gulations must, of necessity, often be cast in general terms, c£.
Mourning v. Family,
U.S.
(dec. 5/ __ /73). Indeed,
this is so of the Constitution in many of its provisions. The Fourth
Amendment itself uses general terms in adopting "reasonableness"
as its test. Reasonably regarded, the regulation in question here
was obviously made to reach the problems described by Mr. Justice
White in relation to borders which extend thousands of miles through
trackless forests or, as here, literally uninhabited desert space; the
government disclaims any purpose of applying them in inhabited areas.
The framers of the Fourth Amendment were farsighted and
perceptive enough to speak in common sense terms that could be
applied to a wide variety of particular situations. An extended search
of the kind contested here could not survive the test of "reasonableness"
if it took place in Boston, New York, or Washington, although these
cities are within 20 miles of a sea border. To speculate that the
Court 1 s holding will open the door to wholesale stopping of cars within
a range of 100 miles from every border and port of entry is idle
hyperbole. It is the extensive, sparsely settled border lands to the
north and south of the United States that are particularly susceptible

- 2 -

to the widespread alien smuggling alluded to in the Court 1 s
opinion and which require the extended border searches whose
reasonableness is torlay sustained.l/ To posit a "parade of
horribles, 11 sue as sweeping searches in a large border city -El Paso, Texas, for example -- is to assume that federal judges
will overlook what Mr . Justice Black said so often, that 11 reasonable 11
under the Fourth Amendment, means 11 reasonable 11 under all the
circumstances --time, place, setting and surroundings . In the
words of Mr. Justice Black:
Our Government is founded upon a written
Constitution. The draftsmen expressed themselves
in careful and measured terms corresponding with
the immense importance of the powers delegated to
them . The Framers of the Constitution, and the
people who adopted it, must be understood to have
used words in their natural meaning, and to have
intended what they said .
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require
that every search be made pursuant to a warrant.
It prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures . 11
The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the
opportunity to procure a warrant , but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances .
The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se
rules; each case must be decided on its facts . Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U . S . 443 , 500 , 509 - 510 .
(Concurring and dissenting opinio n) ( 1971 ).
It may be that y o ur contemplated revisions or P otter 1 s, if he
chooses to respond , will render my comments totally superfluous .
Regards ,

Mr . Justice White
Copies to the Conference

}j
We can judicially notice, from the reported cases in the federal
courts, the extraordinary ingenuity - - and cruelty -- of the devices
used to smuggle aliens in empty border regions, including concealing
then'l in the frames, tanks , and under the hoods of cars .
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~nprtutt

<qcurt cf tqt 'J!ittittb .ita±tll
<q. 2llbl'~~

~agftinghm. ~.

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
To my dissenting opinion in this case I plan
to add the following at an appropriate place in text or
footnote:
The Court's opinion today devot~s more
than four pages to a discussion of the decisions of three Courts of Appeals that
are said to support the conclusion reached
by the Court. But I had always supposed
that it was this Court's precedents that we
were to follow in interpreting the Constitution.

To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr .
Mr.

ft· ~ 7
3rd DRAFT

Chief Justice
Justice Douglas
Justtce Brennan
Just:Lce V/hi te
Just:ice ~.~arshall
Justlce Blackmon
l,)ff · Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
From:
No. 71-6278

Stewart, J.

Circulated:

-------

Condrado Almeida-Sanchez,) On Writ of Certiorari ~iroulatedMAY
Petitioner,
the United States Court
·
v.
of Appeals for the Ninth
United States.
Circuit.
[May - , 1973]

MR.

dissenting.
I agree with the Court that "the power of the National
Government to exclude aliens from the country is undoubted and sweeping." I agree too that this power can
be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of
individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our border.
I also assume that such inspections and searches, to be
valid, need not take place precisely at the border itself,
but may be conducted at the functional equivalent of
the border. But none of these propositions, alone or
together, can support the search of the petitioner's automobile in this case. That search, in my view, was in
goss violation of th<' Fourth Amendment to the
• onstitution.
The basic facts in this case are neither complicated nor
disputed. The petitioner was stopped by the Border
Patrol on State Highway 78 in California, and his car
was thoroughly searched. The road is essentially an
east-west highway that runs for part of its course through
an undeveloped region. At about the point where the
petitioner was stopped the road meanders north as well
as east--;-but nowhere does the road reach the Mexicau
border, and at all points it lies north of Interstate 80,
a major east-west highway entirely within the United
States that connects the Southwest with the west coast.
The petitioner was some 25 air miles north of the border
JusTICE STEWART,

-

11 1973

71-6278-DISSENT

z·

ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES

when he was stopped. It is undenied that there was
no probable cause of any kind for the stop or the subsequent search-not even the "reasonable suspicion'"
found sufficient for a street detention and weapons search
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, and Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143.
The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveillanee
along inland roadways, all in thE' asserted interest of
detecting the illegal importation of aliens. ! ~ermanent
checkp ints are maintained at certain nodal interseetions;J temporary checkpoints are established fro time
to time at various places; and finally, there are rovingpatrols such as the one that stopped and searched the
petitioner's car. In all of these operations, it is arguea,
the agents are acting within the Constitution when they
stop and search automobiles without a warrant, without
probable cause to believe the cars contain aliens, and
even without probable cause to believe the cars havemade a border crossing. The only asserted justification
for this extravagant license to search is § 287 (a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) ,
which simply provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,"
as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by thf;!
Attorney General. The Attorney General's regulation,
8 CFR ~ 287.1 , defines "reasonable distance '' as "within
100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States.'' A quick glance at a map of this
country will indicate just how· many populated areas are·
within 100 miles of an external boundary. It might
come as a surprise to residents and visitors in the City
of Washington, D. C., for example, to learn that there
are a stat~and regulation purporting to authorize
federal agents to stop and thoroughly search their c.ars:

~

.f"'-1 ~

0-b-.J.-~~.._.:J-

71-6278-DISSENT
ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v . UNITED STATES

\

3

on the streets of this city at any time and with no probable cause, in alleged pursuit of illegally entered aliens.

I
No claim is made. nor could one be, that the search of
the petitioner's car was constitutional under any previous
decision of this Court involving the search of an automobile. It is settled, of course, that a stop and search of a
moving automobile can be made without a warrant.
That narrow exception to the warrant requirement was
first established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132. The Court in Carroll approved a portion of the
Volstead Act providing for warrantless searches of automobiles when there was probable cause to believe they
contained 'l1legiil alcoholic beverages. The Court recognize(] that a moving automobile on the open road presents
a situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." 267 U. S., at 153. Carroll has been followed
in a line of subsequent cases, 1 but the Carroll doctrine
does not declare a field day for the police in searching
automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must
be probable cause for the search. 2 As MR. JusTICE
WHITE wrote for the Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 39!}
U. A. 42, 51, "In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's
1
E. g., Chambers v . Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; Dyke v. Taylor Implemeut Mfg. Co., :391 U. S. 216; Brinegar v . United States, 388
U. S. 160 ; Rusty v. Umted States, :282 U. S. 694.
2
Moreover, " neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases 111 this Court

require or suggest that m ever~· conceivable cncum~tancc the search
of an auto even wJth probable cau~e may be made without the extra
proterhon for pnvary that a warrant afford~." Chambers v.
Maroney, :399 U. S., at 50. 8ee alRo Coolidge v New Hampshire,
40:3 U S. 443, 45R--464,

71-6278-DfSSENT

4

ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures1
the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by
the Constitution."
In seeking a rationale for the validity of the search in
this case, the Court thus understandably sidesteps the
automobile search cases. Instead, the Court turns to
cases dealing with administrative inspections. But these
cases provide no firmer support for the extraordinary result the Court reaches today." In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that administrative·
inspections to enforce community health and welfare
regulations could be made on less than probable cause
to believe that particular dwellings were the sites of particular violations. I d., at 534-536, 538. Yet the Court
insisted that the inspector obtain either consent or a warrant supported by particular physical and demographic
characteristics of the areas to be searched. Ibid. See
also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541. Unlike the
inspection in Camara, however, the search in this case
was for evidence of a crime. Cf. ·id., at 534-539.
Moreover, it was conducted in the unfettered discretion
of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have
a warrant, probable cause, or consent. The search thus
embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara
when it insisted that the "discretion of the official in
the field" be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior
to the inspection. ld., at 532-533.
Two other administrative inspection cases relied upon
by the Court today are equally inapposite.
Colonnade·
3

It is to be noted that thi::; case does not mvolve the doctrine of

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, let alone that of Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U S. 217. The exclu::;ionary rule applicable here was
estab!i::;hed almost 60 year;; ago in Weeks v. United States, 232 U .. S.,
383 (1914).,
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Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U. S. 72,
and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, both approved
warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises engaged in businesses closely regulated and licensed by the
Government. In Colonnade, the Court stressed the long
history of federal regulation and taxation of the manufacture and sale of liquor, 397 U.S., at 76-77. In Biswell,
the Court noted the pervasive system of regulation and
reporting imposed on licensed gun dealers, 406 U. S., at
312 n. 1, 315-316.
A central difference between those cases and this one
is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed
and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as
the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here
was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business.
The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him. MR. JusTICE
WHITE, speaking for the Court in Biswell, explained the
difference between that case and the case before us with
precision :
"It is also plain that inspections for compliance
with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats
to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy.
When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license,
he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to
effective inspection. Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that
describe his obligations and define the inspector's
authority . . . . The dealer is not left to wonder
about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of
his task." United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at

:no.

''
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In Colonnade and BisweU, the searching officers knew
with certainty that the premises searched were in fact
utilized for the sale of liquor or guns. In the present
case, by contrast. there was no such assurance that the
individual searchf>d was within the proper scope of official scrutiny-that is, there was no reason whatever to
believe that he or his automobile had even crossed the
border, much less that he was guilty of the commission
of an offense.
II
Since neither this Court's automobile search decisions
nor its administrative inspection decisions provide any
support for the constitutionality of the stop and search
in the present case,' we are left simply with the statute
that purports to authorize automobiles to be stopped and
searched "within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States." .; And it is upon this
statute that the Court today seems ultimately to fasten
in reaching its decision . The syllogism seems to be that
the Fourth Amendment prevents only "unreasonable"
searches and seizures, that Congress has authorized
searches only within a "reasonable" distance from the
border, that 25 miles is a "reasonable distance," and
ergo that this search without probable cause was valid
under the Fourth Amendment. This strikes me as an
extraordinary piece of constitutional logic, and a complete abdication of the duty of judicial review. While I
am familiar with the principle that judges should conThe Court·~ opinion tocht)' devote~ more than four page;; to· \
a discus~10n of the cleci ~ ion;. of thrrr rourto; of appeal:,; that are
sa id to su pport it ~ romlu~ion. Bul I bad alwa)·o; ;;uppo~ecl that
it was this Co urt ·~ prc·reclent~ tha l we wrre to follow in intrrprcting
the Constitution .
5 The Court profe~sr~ not to rei)· on tbr implementin~ regulation
of the Attorney Genrral that authorizes any search of a vehicle for
aliens wi_thin 100 mile::; of the borqrr;.
1
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!3true a statute so as to avoid a constitutional question;
the Court in this case seems to embrace the notion that
it must construe the Constitution so as to avoid a statutory question. I had thought it settled since Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, that the existence of a congressional enactment is only the starting point of constitutional analysis, not its conclusion.
I have no doubt that t~tatute in question could be
construed and applied constitutionally. For example,
searches at an e§tablished station near the border, at a
point marking the confluence of two or more roads all
extending from the border, might be the functional
equivalent of border searches. For another example,
a search of the passengers and cargo of an a!rplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from
Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent
of a border search."
But the search of the petitioner's automobile by the
roving patrol in this case, on a California road that lies
at all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border,
was of a wholly different order. And no Act of Congress could, in my opinion, make this ;earCh constitlJ,..
tionally valid. I have no doubt that Congress considers
the problem of enforcing the immigration laws to be a
serious one, 7 and that officials charged with enforcement

-

6 With rp~prct to aircraft, 8 CFR §281.1 defines "reasonable
distance" as "any distance fixed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section." Paragraph (b) authorizes the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to approve ;;earches at a greatpr distance
than 100 air miles from a border "becaul:le of unusual circumstances."
7 Though the Government ha;; repeatedly conceded that contraband ;;carche~ could not be conducted without probable cause, I
·er nothmg m the reasoning adoptPd today that would prrvent
CongrPSi:l from enactin11: a legi:slntivP authorizatiOn for sParches without probablE' cause for illegally unported narcotics or other contraband . The problrm::; for lnw rnforcement arc at least as great,
~ince any alien who could walk acro~s a border and get into a
car could as Pasily bring eontrnband with h1m.

c>
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of those laws are faced with a difficult task. 8 But such
considerations have not in the past led this Court to
disregard the Constitution. 9
The Court that decided Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, sat during a period in our history when the
Nation was confronted with a law enforcement problem
of no small magnitude-the enforcement of the Prohibition laws. But that Court did not turn its back on the
Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for
the Court in that case clearly controls the case at bar:

"It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to
the inconvenience and mdignity of such a search.
Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his beThe Government rcpre~ent~ that the highwny on which thi~
search occurred 1~ a common route for illegally entered aliens to
travel, and that roving pat rul~ apprehended 192 alienti on that road
in one year. But it i~ of cuur~e quite possible that every one of
those aliens wa~ apprehended a~; a re;;ult of a valid ~earch made upon
probable cause. On the other hand, there i:; no telling how many
perfectly innocent drivers have bern ~topped on thi~ road without
any probable cau::;e, and been snbjrcted to a :;earch in the trunks,
under the hood~, and behind thr rear ~eat~ of the1r automobiles.
9 La t Term, for example, W(' were a,;ked to hold that the Fourth
Amendment wa:; no bar to warrantless Plectronic ~urveillance of persons thought to bP subv('r::;ive~ who~e activities threatened national
security. The claim in United States v. United States Dist1·ict Court,
407 U. S. 297, wa~ not that ~ uch :,;urveillance wns permi~s ible without probable cause, but only that the burden of securing judicial
approval was too grPat. The Court rejrcted this clmm, noting that
,, rajlthough some added burdrn will be Imposrd on thr AttornPy
Grneral, thi~ inconveniencE' is justified m a free society to protect
.c onstitutional values.'' 407 U. S., at 321 .
8
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longings as 0ffects which may be lawfully brought
111.
But those lawfully within the country. entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search.
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." 267
U. S .. at 154.'''

Carroll has been the law for almost 50 years.
follow it and reverse th<' ,1udgment before us.

I would

ThP members of t hP Carroll Court were' hardly men known a ~
impractical theorists. Chief .Ju::;tice Taft 's opimon for the Court
was subscribed to by Mr . Jwstice McKenna. Mr. Justice Holmes.
Mr. Justice VanDevanter, Mr . .Tuo;ti cP BrandC'Ii:l, Mr . .Justice Butler,
and Mr ..Justice Sanford . Mr . .Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice
Sutherland dissent ed upon the ground tha1 the Court had departed
too far from the command ~ of the Fourth AmendmPnt
10

j;u.prrmc ~onrt of tire 'Jlnitc~ ~tate a
~a:sfrinuton.
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I

As my views of -the case and resolution of the problem involved

J

differ .-a-.s••-•t•nltl from those expressed in the opinion of the Court, I
find it necessary to state these views in some detail. We are confronted
here with the all too familiar necessity of reconciling a legitimate need
of government with constitutionally protected rights.

There can be no

question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement
problem with respect to enforcing along thousands of miles of open

\

l

border valid immigration and related laws. Nor can there be any
question as to the necessity, in.... our free society, of safeguarding
persons against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue raised by this

.

~&.

case is possible with due recognition of both of thes~ in
manner compatible with the prior decisions of this Court.

I

a.__,

I

l

2.
I

The search here involved was carried out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to
the Mexican border.

It was not a border search, nor can it fairly

be said to have been a search conducted at the "functional equivalent"
of the border. Nor does this c3;se involve the constitutional propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points removed from
the border or its functional equivalent. Nor, finally, was the
search based on cause in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge

~
concerning an automobile or its passengers.

The question posed,

rather, is whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not
far removed from the border for the purpose of apprehending aliens
illegally entering or in the country.

3.
The Government has made a convincing showing that large
numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places other than
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers,
that even those who cross on foot are met and transported to their
destinations by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles
are the only feasible means of apprehending them. It would, of
course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a constant patrol
along thousands of miles of border. Moreover, because many of
these aliens cross the border on foot, or at places other than
established checkpoints, it is simply not possible in most cases
for the Government to obtain specific knowledge that a person
riding or stowed in an automobile is an alien illegally in the
country.

Thus the magnitude of the problem is clear.

4.
~-

II.
The Governmentt 's argument to sustain the
search here is simply that the search was reasonable
under the circumstances.

But it is by now axiomatic

that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction
with its command that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause."

Under our cases, both

the concept of probable cause and the requirement
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a
search, though in certain limited • circumstances,
neither is required.

0

The prRlem of ascertaining the meaning

----~o~f_t~h~e~,k~c==============--------------------____1[____
probable cause requirement in the context of roving

l

searches of the sort conducted here is measurably

J
assisted by the Court's opinion in Camara v. Mun.icipal
Court, 387

u.s.

relies heavily.

523(1967), on which the Government
The Court was there

conc~d

with the

nature of the probable cause requirement in the
context of searches to identify housing code violations•
a~d

was persuaded that the only workable

method of enforcement was periodic inspection of

I

all structures:
"It is here that the probable cause debate is
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an
area inspection is unavoidably based on its
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole,
not on its knowledge of conditions in each
particular builiing." 387 u.s., at 536.

(

5.
In concluding that such general knowledge met the probable cause

requirement under those circumstances, the Court took note of a
"long history of judicial and public acceptance", of the absence of
other methods for vindicating the public interest in preventing or
abating dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of privacy
occasioned by inspections which are "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime". Id., at 537.
for aliens,
Roving automobile searches in border region

~
1\

been consistently approved by the judiciary. While the question is
one of first impression in this fourt, such searche haveJ uniformli{

\{«t i

tAt" e,J/

beeniJipTm 1 iiCby the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include

those areas of the border between Mexico and the United States where
the problem has been most severe.
Its

liMLBdA811Xh I

HDPQNPPO

See,

~· ~·

,

·r iuorbf8JCfzdir%89f§tfuj ozili)t&U

United States v. Miranda , 426 F.2d 283(CA 9 1970):
Roa-Rodriguez v . United Seces , 410 F.2d 1206(CA 10
Moreover, as noted above , no alternative solution
is reasonabley possible .

1969) .

6.
More troublesome is the problem of determining the extent
to which such searches invade the privacy of those whose automobiles
are searched. It is said that only 3% of aliens apprehended in this
country are prosecuted. The Government therefore argues that such
searches are conducted primarily for administrative rather than
prosecutorial purposes, that their function is simply to locate those
who are illegally here and to deport them. Brief for the United
States, p. 28 n. 25. While this contention offers no great solace
to the innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few who
are prosecuted, it does serve to differentiate this class of searches
from random area searches which are no more than "fishing
expeditions" for evidence to support prosecutions. Nor does the
possibility of prosecution distinguish such searches from the searches
involved in Camara. Despite the Court's assertion in that case

7.
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387
U.S. , at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject
to criminal penalties. Id. , at 523 n. 2.
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these searches ,

according to the Government, are conducted in areas where the
concentration of illegally-present aliens is high, both in absoluta
terms and in proportion to the number of persons legally present. While
these searches are not border searches in the conventional sense,
they are incidental to the protection of the border and draw a large
measure of justification from the Government's extraordinary
responsibilities and powers with respect to the border.

Finally, and

significantly, these are searches of automobiles rather than searches of
persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's
person or of a building. This Court "has long distinguished between an
automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
48 (1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as those in the
affected areas surely know, it is the automobile which in most cases
makes effective the attempts to smuggle aliens into this country.

...

The conjunction of these factors--consistent
judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative

a,
for the solution

of~ lUi:

a~.,__

ilq r'i&tK: problem, and only

a modest intrustion on those whose automobiles
are searches--persuades me that under appropriate
limiting circumstances there may exist constitutionallyadequate probable cause to conduct roving vehicular
searches in border areas.

9.
III

The conclusion that there may be probable cause to conduct
roving searches does not end the inquiry, for "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387

clause reflects an important policy determination:

"The Fourth

Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and
responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute.
. . . But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. " United States v. United
States District Court,

Yo7 U.S.

~tfl,

111 (1972).

See also,

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 491 (1971); Chime! v.
J

\'9

California, 395 U.S. 752, 76'1-:'76'! (1969).

.J

10.
To justify warrantless searches in circumstances like those

of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions to the warrant
requirement.

A brief review of the nature of each of these major

exceptions illuminates the relevant considerations in the present
case. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that
a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons
when/he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct
has taken or is taking place and that the person he searches is armed
and dangerous.

"The sole justification [for such a] search . . . is

the protection of the police officer and others nearby. . . . " 392
U.S., at 29. Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant
requirement here.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), on
which the Government also relies, both concerned the standards
which govern inspections of the business premises of those with

11.

l

federal licenses to engage in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the
sale of guns, Biswell. In those cases, Congress was held to have
power to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated in
Biswell:
'When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he
does so with the knowledge that his business records,
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection. '' 406 U. S. , at 316.
~L

Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be •

• ' d to cover cases of

l

~~,.~1'1
present type. One who travels in regions near the borders of the

"

\

country can hardly be thought to have submitted to inspections in
exchange for a special perquisite.

j Ll-----------.,,~

More closely in point on their facts are the cases · involving

1

automobile searches. ~· ~·, Carroll v. United states, 267

u.s.

132

1

(19JJ'); Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

I

supra.

But while those cases allow automobiles to be searched

'

.
.
.
j:J 1-< <"'- " ('
Without a warrant m certam circumstances, the rationale for this

\

\

exception to the warrant clause is that under those circumstances
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can

1

12.

be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. " Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S.>
at 153.

The Court today correctly points out that a warrantless

search under the Carroll line of cases must be supported by probable
cause in the sense of specific knowledge about a particular automobile.
While, as indicated above, my view is that on appropriate

search in a border area without possessing information about

requirement is inapposite. The very fact that the Government's
supporting information relates to criminal activity._ certain
?1. -.'

zt s* '

1

6

d rather than to evidence about a particular

automobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless
searches relied upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply
the roving searches are justified by experience with obviously
e<-p
'
'ff- .Q_ ~ ~LU.I:'V ~::;.v~.-v- ,._~
non-mobile sections of 1k · d

If gij

''

~~~f...., tJ~

None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement,
then, applies to roving automobile searches in border areas.
Q

Moreover, the propriety of the warrant procedure here is \
C".5ftfc /,(,jJ.~t/

.ff!*~

f . .j"l./1 (/9 '~
•
For the reasons outlined above, the Court there ruled

y Camara.

.f&o :[C!'e

1/,

c~ff o-f S'eo. f/~ I l"l!,

f'.f,,:~• .J,,/ely
1d

1 16"

\.s/.o~" ~

that probable cause could beg*?

n•t

C).

for an area search, but

nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented
searches.

The Court •n•:•

indicated its general approach to

exceptions to the warrant requirement:
"In assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to the warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search in quffition, but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search. " Jilllc 387 U. S., at 533.

t

See also United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407

u. s.J at

315.

l

14 •

.....

The Government argues that Camara and See are
distinguishable from the present case for the
purposes of the warrant requirement.

It is true

that while a building inspector who is refused
admission to a building may easily obtain
a warrant to search that building, a member of the
Border Patrol has no such opportunity when he is refused
n~r.

.

• m~ss~on

to inspect an automobile.

It is also

true that the judicial function envisioned in
Camara extended principally to the details of the
search rather than to "the basic agency decision to
canvass and area 1 " 387

u.s.,

at 532, while the

judicial function here would necessarily include
passing on just such a basic decision.
But it does not follow from these distinctions
that "no warrant system can be constructed that would
be feasible and meaningful."
United States, at 36.

Brief for the

Nothing ~the papers

before use demonstrates that it would

•'

I

15.

not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial
8~

appr9val of the decision to conduct

(

~

.

roa~l

roving search on a particular

'

According to the Government, the

incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is
predictable, and the roving searches are apparently planned in
advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule.
a.

I

-v-/

The use ofJ~t procedure 11 P I

l would surely not "frustrate the

governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal
Court, supra, 378 U.S., at 533. It would of course entail some
1

inconvenience, b u t - inconvenience has never been thought to be

€". ;)
an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement.

United

States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 321.

''·

I

Although standards for probable cause in the context of this
case are relatively unstructured (cf. United States v. .United States
District Court,

[

there are a number of relevant

factors which would merit consideration:
they include (i) the frequency
with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably
believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity
of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and
geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein
and the extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope

I.

of the proposed search, its duration, and the demographic

'

characteristics of the area.1

J

17.

"*·
*

In short, the determination of whether a warrant should be

issued for an area search involves a balancing of the legitimate
interests of law enforcement

with~ ~~mendment rights.•
/\

This presents the type of delicate question
of constitutional judgment which ought to be resolved by the Judiciary
rather than the Executive. In the words of Camara,
'this is precisely the discretion to invade private
property which we have consistently circumscribed
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the need to search." 387 U.S. at 532-533.
Nor does the novelty of the problem posed by roving searches
in border areas undermine the importance of a prior judicial determination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem last
term in United States District Court, supra, we recognized that the
focus of the search there involved was "less precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crime," and that
•

"[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment

if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
government . . . and the protected rights of our citizens." 407

/-s,
'1t
tJ. S. 1 at 322-323. Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment
commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is feasible
with due regard to the interests affected1fFor the reasons stated
above, I think a rational search warrant procedure is feasible in
cases of this kind. As no warrant was obtained here, I agree that
the judgment must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts of this
particular case.

•.

FOOTNOTES

L. I am in accord with the Court's conclusion that nothing in
8 U.S. C.

§

l357(a) or in 8 CFR 287 .l serves to authorize an otherwise

unconstitutional search.
2. The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states explicitly
that "We . . . do not take the position that the checking operations are
justified because the officers have probable cause or even 'reasonable
suspicion' to believe, with respect to each vehicle checked, that it
contains an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness of establishment
of the checking operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular
reason to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United
States , pp . 9 -10 .
3. There is no reason why a judicial officer could not approve where

2.
appropriate a series of roving searches over the course of several
days or weeks.

Experience with an initial search or series of searches

would be highly relevant in considering applications for renewal of
a warrant.
4. Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which may
contain one or more roads or tracks. Particularly along much of the
Mexican border, there are vast areas of uninhabited desert and arid land
which are traversed by few, if any, main roads or highways, but which
nevertheless may afford opportunities -- by virtue of their isolated
character - for the smuggling of aliens.
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The Court's opinion sufficiently establishes
that none of our Fourth Amendment decisions
supports the search conducted in this case 1
~ut irllllillllt•• ,

in my view, liilauailllil••smpiuziax it

\ so without develop~
does *snnaMtkasaL tq an adequate conception of
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this

\

context ,

While the
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mere fact that the Government has a
serious law enforcement problem does not
repea 1, pro tanto, the RaznsFuu •6
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protections of the Fourth Amendment, neither is
it irrelevant
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It is by
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The search tms•tmub& at issue here was
rn svrtvr carried out as part of a roving search
of automobiles in an area generally proximate to

I

the Mexican border.

The search was not a border

search, nor was it a search conducted at the
"functional equivalent"of the border.

Toe

Almeida-Sanchez, page two.
The Government does not argue that it •
paapr l5 eeiidasl!

'CI

rJP

1
•

a conventional border search

c., e~ hi jJ rofJ',.. ~
De c • #l eluc.:l t!'-/
on the facts of this cas .•
the search

/

' - -- - ----..J

l

J

.,.,.~1/y
u

in the ordinary sense of specific
knowledge concerning an automobile or its
passengers.

The Solicmtor Generars brief in

this Court states explicitly that "We
do not take the position that the

• • •

checkin~perations

are justified becaue the officers have probable
cause or even 'reasonable suspicion ' to believe,
with respect to each vehicle checked , that it contains
an illegal alien.

Apart from the reasonableness

of estatllishment of the checking operation in this
case. there is nothing in the re• cord
to indicate that the Border Pa ttrol officers
had any special k or particular reason to
stop petitioner and examine his car,"

Brief

for the United States , pp. 9-10.

-

..

..

...

propriety
of searches at permanent checkpoints removed from
the border or its functional equivalent,
The question posed by this case , rather,
is whether and under what circumstances

A-S, page • three.
the border patrol may conduct r• oving searches
of automobiles in areas not far removed f • rom the
border for fue purpose of apprehending aliens
illegally in the country.
made a persuasive

The Government has

Jii"ij;ini'-aau

in this Court

that large numbers of aliens cross
certain sections of this country ' s borders
.-..aasda• illegally ..- at places other than
established crossing points, tits
l!!IUIIIf!IBHt!e:el •

wa

uhss

a 1 them.

b; aaeumo\5tlE. to bhlillf ele:stit uti

iM

Litts Ed&Wy , that they are often assisted by

B'¢Qmphj

that

1e

t o thuiJI

eltlbt!i:n&tsE6h&

everl!=W/usa,,,.

hi 2hL&

66&ilt!i!~

cross on foot are

transported to their destinations by automobiles,
and that roving checks of automobiles are
apprehending them short of

the

maintaining a constant patrol along thous• ands of
miles of border.

ese aliens cross the

border on foot and away from established
1

che~oints,

it is simply not possible in most

cases tzrt••= for the border patrol to obtain
specific knowledge that a person riding or stowed
in an autoB*mobile is an alien il• legally in the
country,

A-S, page four,
In short, the Government has good reason to believe
that it has a stati• stically high chance of
apprehending aliens if it conducts roving checks on
certain roads at certain times •

.::0:::
4-~e-

S~arc

4

s•sr1m was reasonable under the cirac umstances,
But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches
and seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its
command that "{w]arrants shall not issue except upon
probable cause".
tlm

~nder our cases ~
Ji't Rtczz••••imuidi• kki!lX&stsq , trEY¥

both the concept of probable cause and

the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonablenes
of a search , though in certain limited c• ircumstances,
neither is required,

...u..•••••••·~..•s••••~n•e~c:

~1~t. .•e~

In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

\

u.s.

523(1967),

on which the Government relies heavily, the Court

[

r,.-lu~~/
was concerned with the~ t ' ff of the probable cause

requirement in the context of searches to identify
housing code violations,

The Court was persuaded

that the only workable method of housing code

\

was periodic inspection of all structures,

!

A-S, page five.
"It is here that the probable cause debate is
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct
an area inspection is unavoidably based on its
appraisal of conditions in the area as a
whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in
each particular building." 387 u.s., at 536,

II
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In ....

.......

concluding trnc such general k rr.owledge

.-MW~~--~------

--~-.~

the probable cause requirement 48•r....,.............
.
ua.der those

circ ~mstances,

the Court took

note of a "long history of judicial and public
acceptance", of the absena ce of other methods
for vindicating the public interest in preventing
or abating dangerous conditions, and of the
limited invasion of privacy occasioned by inspections
which are "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime".
Id. , at 537.

,,·

A-S, page six.
Roving autof'Tll1o bile searches
regions

~ have,

likewise, been

by the j•udiciary.

oHIIJIII!'II!lfkftl!!!

in border

cons~tently

approved

Whixle the question is one of

first impression in this court, such searches have
uniformly been approved by the courts of appeals
who jurisidictions
border

inclu~de

between ~exico

those areas of the

and the United States where the

problem _. has been most severe.

See , e.g,

Moreover, as noted avove, the problem is one which
resists solution by other fe• asible means,
More troublesome is the problem of determining
the extent to which

sue~

searches invade the privacy

of those whose automobiles are searched,

From the fact

that only 3% of aliens apprehended in this country
are prosecuted,

that such
9Q

rather

IT

A-S, page seve 11.

'to<~~

is simply to

0.'1~

~f!I:U~:Chose

1-D •

ot~p~

who are illegally here--c___

,..f- ilt<!-,... ..

Brief for the United States, at 28 n, 25,
While this contention offers no gr•eat solace
to the innocent whose automobiles are searched
or to those who are prosecuted, it serves to
differentiate, to some extent, this class of
searches from area searches which are noe more than
"fishing expeditions" for evidence.

The fact

that aliens illegally in the country and those who
transport of harbor them are subject to prosecution
does not distinguish such searches from the
searches invo~ed in Camara,

Despite the Court's

\.'a.. -1 h-.-f us~.J
assertion-stszz z. that the searches were not "aimed
at the discovery of crime", 387

u.s.,

at 537,

violators of the housing code there were subject
to criminal penalties,

is the fact that such searches are, according to
the Government, conducted in areas where the
concentration of illegally-present aliens is very
high,

While these searches are not border searches

in the conventional sense, they are incidental to
the protection of the border and draw some measure

A-S, page eight.
of justification from the Government's extraordinary
responsibilities and powers with respect to the
border,
Finaljy, and signficantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of

..w persons or buildings,

*--••• 21

This Court "has long

distinguished between an automobile and a home or
office."
(19

).

Chambers v. Maroney, 399

u.s.

42,48

As the Government has demonstrated,

and as those in the affected areas surely know,
it is the automobile which in many cases makes
effective the attempts to ....~

smuggle

aliens into

this country,
The conjunction of these factors--consistsnt
judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative
for the solution of an important problem,
and only a modest intrusaion on those whose
automobiles are searched--persuades me that
uder appropriate circumstances there exists
constitutionally-adequate probable cause to
conduct •nsnst

811B

t

1

t•

2

E

searches of the sort conducted in this case.

\

A-S, page nine.

III.
The conclusion that

there may be probable

cause to conduct roving searches does not end
the inquiry, for "except in certain carefully
defined • caR classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent -. is 'unreasonable'
unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S.,
at 528-529,

a E

•

ROll

contemplate the executive officers of Government
as neutral and disinterested magistrates.

Their

duty and respo ni sibility is to enforce the • laws,
1"'

to investigate and to prosecute • • . • But hose
~

charged with this investigative and prosecutorial
duty should not be the sole judges of when to
utilize•

constitutio~ly

their tasks."
District Court,

sensitive means in pursuing

United States v. United States

u.s.

(1972)

A-S, page ten.
See alsox Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
491(1971); Chimel v. California, 395

u.s.

752, 764-765

( 1969).
To justify warrantless searches in circumstances
like those presented in th• is case, the Government
makes reference

"'!t...lllllli?
ili?illllllliF•••

a long list of

this eourt's decisions recognizing exceptions to
the warrant

•••a....a•••• requirement.

the nature of each of

~or

A brief review of

exceptions illuminates

the relevant considerations in the present case.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.

1(19CI ), the Court held

that a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down"
search for weapons when he has reasonable grounds
for believing that criminal
--~·

... has taken

conduct~·-.

or is taking place and that the person he

searches is armed and dangerous.
~Lror

justification

such

"The sole

q7 search •

• • is

the protection of the police officer and others
nearby. • •

u.s.,

392

II

at 29.

Nothing in

Terry supports an exception to the warrant
a~&Hli
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requirement here., 1tBbxxuirnxiPmna•g•a:iln&ita•
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A-S, page eleven.
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Coli onnade

Catering Corp. v. United States, 397

u.s.

72

(1970), and United States v. Biswell, ~Ob u,s. ~11
(1 9 7 2 ) t

7

7

7

:i!l£112~·~!!2~!!!!!!!!!!1.?1!!1!!11!!!!!!J!!!!!!IIi1

. .

on which the Government al ~ relies, both
concerned the standards which govern inspections
of the business pre5mises a£

z of ..........

l

those with federal licenses to engage in
the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the sale of

;:t;

..f).(/)S c
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~illllnrjiiMMitfil
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a n gw warrest 1:n se.sictiL. spe
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s
l. .t~n

Biswell...J

7

,

"When a dealer chooses to engage in this
pervasively regulated business and to accept
a federal license, he does so with the
knowledge that his

busi~ness
'-"'

records, firearms,

and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection,"

406

u.s.,

at 316,

<'

A-S, page twelve.

C~onnade
cover

and Biswell cannot fairly be

'±mq u&X£1&12&

type.

•

str~hed

to

cases of the present

One who travels in regions near the borders

of the country can hardly be thought to have

•

submitted to inspections in exchange for

a special perquisite.

are the
cases

More closely in
involving automobile searches.
~arroll

v. United States, 267

3 · 'II

E.g., ,

u.s.

132(19

);

• ryp,.«.;
4~9~9~ij~u"e~.~----~(~1~,~~)~•

Chambers v. Maroney,

\

.su;~'l

v. New Hampshire, ~3

Hu

•

41

•

3(1 a

Coolidge

But while

those cases allow automobiles to be searched
without a warrant in certain circumstances, the
rationale for this exception to the warrant
clause is that under those circumstances "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant becaase the
vehicle . . can be quickly moved out of the
locality & or jurisdiction in which the warratt
must be sought."

267

u.s.,

at 153,

Carroll v. United States, supra, - seAs the Gwmt 'izdsg r t tts e:W•

t • ths t
"e!'ic: police muse ttaee: pra'lual111 •o ••• •• 1 lflfliiB•
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ntef se;a£ ett.
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A-S, page HI_. sa thirteen,
The Court ar· rss ' 7 today correctly points out that
7
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un~er

1
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warrantless search

, gtsu1
-
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.._
illl-'-a.
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the carroll line of cases must be supported

by probable cause in the •••t•II'•FS.'• sense

•* ' sanibttti!Qk

of specific knnowledge about a particular autommbile.
While, as indicated above, my view is that
on appropriate facts the wzzzrzcznL Government -..,.
can establish probable cause for a roving search in
a border area without possessing information about
pari t • icular automobiles, it by no means follows
that the warrant requirement is inappos• ite,
. ~pportinsJ
The very fact that the Government' ~Liana hiformation
arras rr relates to criminal activity ta on .P••naazm•K
~

certain stretches of road rather than to

evidence about a particular automobile renders
irrelevant the • · vvr i

~

justification for

warrantless searches . . relied upon in Carroll and its
progeny,
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Quite simply, ••

A-S, page fourteen.
the roving searches are justified by experience with
obviously non-mobile sections of highway.
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant
requirement, then, applies to roving automobile

se~hes

in border areas.

Moreover, the propriety

of the warrant procedure here is confirmed
by Camara.

For the ...... reasons outlined above,

the Court there ruled that probable cause could
be established for an area sea• rch,

~ut

...

ts •n•zzsM'.........
w•t•m•r nonetheless required that

a warrant be obtained for unconsented searches.
The Court there indicated its
general approach to . . . exceptions to the warrant
requirement:
"In assessing whether the public interest
demands creation of a general exception to
the warrant requirem~t, the question is
not whether the publtc interest justifies the
type of search in question, but whether the authority
to search should be evidenced by a warrant,
which in turn depends in part upon whether•
the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the

A-S, page fifteen.
search."

387 U.S. , at 533.

See also United
supra,

'fo7

S~es

v. United

S~es

Histt rict Court,

U.S., at 31s-.

Like the area .._ building inspection searches
at issue in Camara and See, roving a• utomobile
searches in border areas are justified by
accumulated information regarding sections of
highway.
k

h

The Government argues that
•1 ;

n those cases are distinguishalbe

g ·

\ on several grrunds /
~
5
t 2
• from the

:&:niZ!s£1

I

present one for the purposes of the warrant
requirement.

It is true, as the Governement

contends, that while . . building

inspector ~

who is refused
obtain a warrant to search that building,
a member of the Border Patrol cannot feasibly
obtain a warrant whenever he is refu• sed perm• ission
to inspect an

auto~obile.

Accordingly, - . .

judicial scrutiny would perforce be limited to
Ji b

p il

% IIi

.

I

7

.....-J proposed roving search.

propriety of a

•HNu.-;~g~
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passing on the general
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A-S, page sixteen.
lfl

It is also true

· -zasr

tha~he

,

·

I

judicial •w-....... function

envisioned in Camara extended principally to the
details of the search rather than to "the basic
agency decision to canvass an..•a•u•-area."

,t7l
3J.W

u Is I f

at 532, while any judicial function here would
necessarily concern just
such a basic decision.
Despite the Government's assertion to
the

~ ontrary,

however, it does not fmllow

that "no warrant system can be constructed that would
be feasible and meaningful."
States, at 36,

Brief for the United

Nothing in the papers before us

demonstrates that it would not be feasible
for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial
approval of the decision to conduct a roving
search ius t rannir t

I

at a particular time.

According to the

Government, the

3

i ~ciadence

on a particular road

of illegal transportation

of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the
roving searches are apparently plaaned in advance
or carried out according to a predetermined schedule.

A-S, page seventeen,
The use of a procedure of this sort would surely
not "frustrate the governmental purpose il behind
the search,"

u.s.,

Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 378

at 533,

It would of course entail some

in.convenience, but mere inconvenience has

thoug~eqaute

been

the warrant requirement.

o,~ 1,~ 1

eo.,, t

neve~

reason . . for abrogating

u,.; ft!'rl
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Moreover, such screening would in my view
be

meaningful,~; ;::=~£e.;;=:;g~.e;:~~::d,}

standards for probable cause in this context
liMllnH••snmrx••~•••

are

rea latively unstructured.

Among the :imt:ttanw••rnillrnr••illi&nui relevant factors
are ¥•

trtarrtn Mhrni&ndnn••••q'i£'!Yxmtxyyyyxpsn• nft.M

the frequency with which aliens illegally in the
country are transported on a particular stretch of
the road in
question to the border,
incidence of

~

Whether a particular

transportation at a particular

distance from the border is sufficiently a problem
to justify the invasion of privacy occasioned by

-.t'!J.-IRJ•n•n•••••• a

llli"iiiPil'llil·lll
_

roving search . - involves a

delicate question of constitutional judgment _.a-- ..;lu'c, l

o"::t..r- +o

be r-tr>.sol,r:-J by T~t!! J..,cl,'e,,;7 ,.,Hte,.. f'lt.o.,.

in11 .XYXiiMN"@RBiW In the words of Camara,
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fire.
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A-S, page eighteen.
"This is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have consistently
cricumscribed by a requirement that a
disinterested party warrant the need to
search."

~

387

u.s.,

at 532. -533.

The novelty of the problem posed by roving searches
in border areas in no way undermines the importance
of

a prior judicial determination.

faced with a similarly

e&

When

unconventional problem •

last Term in United States v. United States District
~vet:..ti.J

Court, we recognized that the ..v&vstz standards
1\

~ governing

electronic surveillance

security cases
those

in \jii st ~

may be less ~¥.....
1.
•• precise than

~......~ controlling

.

surveillance

{ &f 0 ?
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.!'.-<

in cases of ordinary cr 1.me , '-:!tn trua •

4 :

t

u

3 ?-

y

-

•Jmlllls••••z•s•r•n••-a-llllfiilfiit••n•lirizlir•••••v•niin~••'•a.. Yet at the s arne
time we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment's
commitment to the use of search warrants wherever
possible.

Because no warrant was obtained here,

I agree that the

~ judgment / .

Alt

a ••

must be reversed.
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Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U. S.

Dear Byr on:
Please join me in the above and consider
this "join" withdrawal of my previously circulated
concurrence.
Regards,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez
MR. J USTICE POWELL concurring.
The Court's opinion sufficiently establishes that none of
our Fourth Amendment decisions supports the search conducted
in this case, but, in my view, it does so without developing an
adequate conception of the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this
context. While the mere fact that the Government has a serious
law enforcement problem does not repeal, pro tanto, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, neither is it irrelevant.
I

The search at issue here was carried out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to
the Mexican border. The search was not a border search, nor
was it a search conducted at the "functional equivalent" of the
border.

The Government does not argue that a conventional border

search on the facts of this case could properly be conducted. Nor
does this case involve the constitutional propriety of searches at

2.
permanent checkpoints removed from the border or its functional
equivalent. Nor, finally, was the search based on cause in the
ordinary sense of specific knowledge concerning an automobile or
its passengers. The Solicitor General!B brief in this Court states

I

I

I

explicitly that 'We ..• do not take the position thtlt the o••l113
checking operations are justified because the officers have probable
cause or even 'reasonable suspicion' to believe, with respect to
each vehicle checked, that it contains an illegallltilmlx alient.
Apart from the reasonJtbleness of establishment of the checking
operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular reason
to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United states,
pp. 9-10.

The question posed by this case, rather, is whether and
under what circumstances the border patrol may conduct roving
searches of automobiles in areas not far removed from the border
for the purpose of apprehending alients illegally in the country.

3.
The Government has made a persuasive showing in this Court that

sections of this country's borders illegally at places other than
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers,
that even those who cross on foot are transported to their destinations
by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the only
feasible means of apprehending them short of maintaining a constant
many
patrol along thousands of miles of border. BecausE¥ of these Dk
aliens cross the border on foot, and away from established checkpoints,
it is simply not possible in most cases for the border patrol to obtain
specific knowledge that a person riding or stowed in an automobile
is an alient illegally in the country.

In short, the Government

has good reason to believe that it has a statistically high chance
of apprehending alients if it conducts roving checks on certain
roads at certain times.

4.
II

The Government's argument to sustain the search here is
simply that the search was reasonablJ under the circumstances.
But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment's prosectiption
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction
with its command that "[w ]arrants shall not issue ,except upon
probable cause". Under our cases both the concept of probable cause
and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a
search, though in certain limited circumstances, neither is required.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), on which the

Government relies heavily, the Court was concerned with the nature
of the probable cause requirement in the context of searches to
identify housing code violations. The Court was persuaded that the
only workable method of housing code was periodic inspection of
all structures.
"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused,

for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection
is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in
the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions
in each particular building. " 387 U. S., at 536.

5.
In concluding that such generallmowledge met the probable cause

requirement under those circumstances, the Court took note of a
"long history of judicial and public acceptance", of the absence of
other methods for vindicating the public interest in preventing or
abating dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of privacy
occasioned by inspections which are "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime". ld., at 537.
Roving automobile searches in border regions have, likewise,
been consistently approved by the judiciary. While the question is
one of first impression in this court, such searches have uniformly
been approved by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include
those areas of the border between Mexico and the United states where
the problem has been most severe. See,

.

-

~· ~·

,

6.

Moreover, as noted above, the problem is one which resists solution
by other feasible means.

More troublesome is the problem of determining the extent
to which such searches invade the privacy of those whose automobiles
are searched. From the fact that only 3% of aliens apprehended in
this country are prosecuted, the Government argues that such searches
at bottom are condicted for administrative rather than prosecutor1al
purposes, that their function is simply to locate those who are
illegally here and to deport them. Brief for the United States, at
28 n. 25. While this contention offers no great solace to the
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to those who are
prosecuted, it serves to differentiate, to some extent, this class
of searches from area searches which are no more than "fishing
expeditions" for evidence. The fact that aliens illegally in the
country and those who transport or harbor them are subject to
prosecution does not distinguish such searches from the searches
involved in Camara. Despite the Court's assertion in that case

..

,

7.
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387

U.s.,

at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject

to criminal penalties.
Of perhaps more weight is the fact that such searches are,
according to the Government, conducted in areas where the
concentration of illegally-present aliens is very high. While
these searches are not border searches in the conventional sense,
they are incidental to the protectionof the border and draw some measure
of justification from the Government's extraordinary responsibilities
and powers with respect to the border.
Finally, and significantly, these are searches of automobiles
rather than searches of persons or buildings. This Court ''has long
distinguished between an automobile and a home or office. Chambers
v.

~arC?Jley,

399 U.s. 42, 48 (19 ). As the Government has

demonstrated, and as those in the affected areas surely lmow,
1t

is the automobile which in many cases makes effective the attempts

to smuggle aliens k into this country.

8.

The conjunction of these factors -consistent judicial approval,
absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution of an important
problem, and only a modest intrusion on those whose automobiles
are searched - persuades me that under appropriate circumstances
there exists constitutionally-adequate probable cause to conduct
searches of the sort conducted in this case.

9.

m
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to conduct
roving searches does not end the inquiry, for "except in certain
carefully defined classes of eases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless 1t has been authorized
by a valid search warrant.'' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387

U. S. at 528, 529. I have recently stated that in my view the warrant
clause reflects an important policy determination: "The Fourth
Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and
responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute•
• • . But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." United states v. United
~at~s

D_!strict Coux:!1

__

U.s. _ , ___ (1972). See also,
I

gool~~- v. -~ew Ha_~pshire,.

\

403 u.S. 443, 491 (1971); Chimel v.

1
\'.

Californ_!!, 395 U.S. 752, 764-765 (1969).

·"'.

10.
To justify warrantless searches in circumstances like those
presented in this case, the government makes reference to a long list
of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions to the warrant

requirement. A brief review of the nature of each of these major
exceptions illuminates the relevant considerations in the present
case. In Terr_y v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that
a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons
when the has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct
has taken or is taking place and that the person he searches is armed
and dangerous. "The sole justification [for such a] search . . . is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby. • . . " 392
u.s., at 29. Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant
requirement here.
Colo~ade

Catering Corp. v. United states, 397 U.s. 72

(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), on
which the Government also relies, both concerned the standards
which govern inspections of the business premises of those with

11.
federal licenses to engage in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the
sale of guns,

~iswell.

In those cases, Congress was held to have

power to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated in
Biswell:
"When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he
does so with the lmowledge that his business records,
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection. " 406 U. S. , at 316.
Colonnad~

and Biswell cannot fairly be stretched to cover cases of

present type. One who travels in regions near the borders of the
country can hardly be thought to have submitted to inspections in
exchange for a special perquisite.
More closely in point on their facts are the casesiinvolving
automobile searches.
(19

~·

fi·, Carroll v. United states, 267

); Chambers v. Maroney,

~upra,

u.s.

132

Coblidge v. New Hampshire,

supra. But while those cases allow automobiles to be searched
without a warrant in certain circumstances, the rationale for this
exception to the warrant clause is that under those circumstances
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can

12.
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdictbm in which the

warrant must be sought. " Carroll v. United states, supra, 267 U. s.
at 153.

The Court today correctly points out that a warrantless

search under the

Carro_!~

line of cases must be supported by probable

cause in the sense of specific lmowledge about a particular automobile.
While, as indicated above, my view is that on appropriate
facts the Government can establish probable cause for a roving
search in a border area without possessing information about
particular automobiles, it by no means follows that the warrant
requirement is inapposite. The very fact that the Government's
supporting information relates to criminal activity on certain
stretches of road rather than to evidence about a particular
automobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless
searches relied upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply
the roving searches are justified by experience with obviously
non-mobile sections of highway.

13.
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement,
then, applies to roving automobile searches in border areas.
Moreover, the propriety of the warrant procedure here is confirmed
by _9a~3._!'a.

For the reasons outlined above, the Court there ruled

that probable cause could be established for an area search, but
nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented
searches. The Court there indicated its general approach to
exceptions to the warrant requirement:
"In assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to the warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search in quettion, but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search. " 1I9M 387 U. s. , at 533.
See also

UJ!!t~~

States v. United States District Court, supra, 407

U.S. at 315.
Like the area building inspection searches at issue in
C~In:.a~a

and

Se~,

roving automobile searches in border areas are

justified by accumulated information regarding sections of highway.

14.

The Government argues that those cases are distinguishable on
several grounds from the present one for the purposes of the warrant
requirement. It is true, as the Government contends, that while a
building inspector who is refused admission to a building may rather
easily obtain a warrant to search that building, a member of the
Border Patrol cannot feasibly obtain a warrant whenever he is
refused permission to inspect an automobile. Accordingly, judicial
scrutiny would perforce be limited to passing on the general propriety
of a proposed roving search. It is also true that the judicial function
envisioned in Camara extended principally to the details of the search
rather than to "the basic agency decision to canvass an area." 387
U.S., at 532, while any judicial function here would necessarily
concern just such a basic decision.
Despite the Government's assertion to the contrary, however,
it does not follow that "no warrant system can be constructed that

would be feasible and meaningful. " Brief for the United states,
at 36. Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it wouli

'·

'

.·

15.

not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial
approval of the decision to conduct a roving search on a particular
road at a particular time. According to the Government, the
incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is
predictable, and the roving searches are apparently planned in
/

advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule.
The use of a procedure of this sort would surely not "frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal
Court,

~upra,

378 U.s., at 533. It would of course entail some

inconvenience, but mere inconvenience has never been thought to be
an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement. United
states v. United states District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 321.
Moreover, such screening would in my view be meaningful.
For reasons already discussed, standards for probable cause in this
context are relatively unstructured. Among the relevant factors
are the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are
transported on a particular stretch of road and the proximity of

16.
the road in question to the border. Whether a particular incidence
of transportation at a particular distance from the border is
sufficiently a problem to justify the invasion of privacy occasioned by
a roving search involves a delicate question of constitutional judgment
which ought to be resolved by the judicial rather than by the executive.
In the words of

C~mara,

"This is precisely the discretion to invade private
property which we have consistently circumscribed
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the need to search. " 387 U.S., at 532-533.
The novelty of the problem posed by roving searches in border
areas in no way undermines the importance of a prior judicial
determination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem
last Term in

Unit~d

States_ v. United States District Court, supra, we

recognized that the standards governing electronic surveillance in
domestic security cases may be less precise than those controlling
surveillance in cases of ordinary crime, 407 U. S. , at 322. Yet at
the same time we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment's commit·
ment to the use of search warrants wherever possible. Because no
warrant was obtained here, I agree that the judgment must be reversed.

'

'

'

..

2.
I

The search here involved was carried out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to
the Mexican border. It was not a border search, nor can it fairly
be said to have been a search conducted at the "functional equivalent"
of the border. Nor does this case involve the constitutional propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points removed from
the border or its functional equivalent. Nor, finally, was the
search based on cause in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge
concerning an automobile or its passengers. The question posed,
rather, is whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not
far removed from the border for the purpose of apprehending aliens
illegally entering or in the country.

3.
The Government has made a convincing showing that large
numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places other than
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers,
that even those who cross on foot are met and transported to their
destinations by automobiles, and that Doving checks of automobiles
are the only feasible means of apprehending them. It would, of
course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a constant patrol
along thousands of miles of border. Moreover, because many of
these aliens cross the border on foot, or at places other than
established checkpoints, it is simply not possible in most cases
for the Government to obtain specific knowledge that a person
riding or stowed in an automobile is an alien illegally in the
country. Thus the magnitude of the problem is clear.

7.
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387

U.s. , at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject
to criminal penalties.

~·,

at 523 n.2.

Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that theee searches ,

according to the Government, are conducted in areas where the
concentration of illegally-present aliens is high, both in absolute
terms and in proportion to the number of persons legally present. While
these searches are not GJorder searches in the conventional sense,
they are incidental to the protection of the border and draw a large
measure of justification from the Government's extraordinary
responsibilities and powers with respect to the border. Finally, and
significantly, these are searches of automobiles rather than searches of
persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's
person or of a building. This Court .,has long distinguished between an
automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
48 (1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as those in the
affected areas surely lmow, it is the automobile which in most cases
makes effective the attempts to smuggle aliens into this country.

...
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FOOTNOTES

L. I am in accord with the Court's conclusion that nothing in
8

u.s.c.

§

1357(a) or in 8 CFR 287.1 serves to authorize an otherwise

unconstitutional search.
2. The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states explicitly
that ''We ••• do not take the position that the checking operations are
justified because the officers have probable cause or even 'reasonable
suspicion' to believe, with respect to each vehicle checked, that it
contains an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness of establishment
of the checking operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular
reason to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United
States, pp. 9-10.
3. There is no reason why a judicial officer could not approve where

2.
appropriate a series of roving searches over the course of several
days or weeks. !Experience with an initial search or series of searches
would be highly relevant in considering applications for renewal of
a warrant.
4. Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which may
contain one or more roads or tracks. Particularly along much of the
Mexican border, there are vast areas of uninhabited desert and arid land
which are traversed by few, if any, main roads or highways, but which
nevertheless may afford opportunities-- by virtue of their isolated
character - for the smuggling of aliens.

I

lfp/ss

lee

Rider.(\, p. 1 (Almeida) 6/6/73

As my views of the case and resolution of the problem involved

differ somewhat from those expressed in the opinion of the Court, I
find it necessary to state these views in some detaiL We are confronted
here with the all too familiar necessity of reconciling a legitimate need
of government with constitutionally protected rights. There can be no
question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement
problem with respect to enforcing along thousands of miles of open
border valid immigration and related laws. Nor can there be any
question as to the necessity, in axhx our free society, of safeguardtn.,g
persons against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue raised by this
case is possible with due recognition of both of these issues, and
manner compatible with the prior decisions of this Court.

~tl

lfp/ss

lee

Rider A, p. 15 (Almeida) 6/6/73

Although standards for probable cause in the context of this
case are relatively unstructured (cf. United states v. trnited States
:Qi~.!_rict

Court1

~~..~!.!".!,

at 322), there are a number of relevant

factors which would merit consideration: without attempting a
definitive or all inclusive statement, they include ( i) the frequency
with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably \
believed to be transported within a particular area; (11) the proximity
of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and
geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein
and the extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope ,
I

I

of the proposed search, its duration, and the demographic
characteristics of the area. •
*Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause ,
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which
may contain one or more roads or tracks. It is to be bome in mind,
particularly along much of the Mexican border, that there are vast
areas of uninhabited desert and arid land which are traversed by
few, if any, main roads or highways, but which nevertheless may
afford opportunities ... by virtue of their isolated character for the
smuggling of a t:llli.!iC;u aliens.

2.
Jn short, the determination of whether a warrant should be

issued for an area search involves a balancing of the legitimate
interests of law enforcement with the Fourth Amendment rights of
i!DIDfK

innocent persons. This presents the type of dellcate question

of constitutional judgment which ought to be resolved by the Judieiary
I

rather than the Executive. Jn the words of Camara,
"this is precisely the discretion to invade private
property which we have consistently circumscribed
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the need to search. " 387 u.S. at 532-533.
Nor does the novelty of the problem posed by roving searches
in border areas undermine the importance of a prior judicial deter ...
mination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem last
term in

Unite_~_~ates

District Court, supra, we recognized that the

focus of the search there involved was ''less precise than that
direeted against more conventional types of crime," and that
~

"[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment

if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of

government . . . and the protected rights of our citizens. " 407

,'

3.
U.s. at 322-323. Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment

commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is feasible
with due regard to the interests affected. For the reasons stated
above, I think a rational search warrant procedure is feasible in
cases of this kind. As no warrant was obtained here, I agree that
the judgment must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts of this
particular case.

!
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Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Potter and Byron:
At long last, I have produced a draft which reflects my
thinking and conclusion on the above case.

Although I will not be able to circulate this until Monday~
and may have some further changes, I thought it was best to
get it to the two of you immediately. I regret having held you
up, and in the case of Byron to be in the unwelcome position
of depriving him of a Court.
My draft is written, as you will see, on the assumption
that the case will now be reversed. In short, I agree with the
result reached by Potter but for somewhat different reasons.
Sincerely,

Enclosure
LFP/gg

' .,

June 11, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Banchez v. U. S.

Here is a concurring opinion. ·
As I would reverse the judgment, I have assumed that Potter's

opinion would become the plurality opinion of the Court.

L.F.P., .' Jr.

,(
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•
'

.jltJlttlttt Q}ttttrl of tqt ~tb" .jta:l:tg

-asfringt~ !Q. (!}. 20p}1~

f

Jl ~-~ E C 0 p

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

June 11, 1973

PLEASE R£TIRN'

TO FILE

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Here is a concurring opinion.
As I would reverse the judgment, I have assumed that Potter's
opinion would become the plurality opinion of the Court.

L. F. P., Jr.
ss

'

-·

~tq.rrl.'me <!fourt
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

June 11, 1973

RE: No. 71-6278 - Aln.eida-Sanchez v.
United States
Dear Potter :
I an. . still with you, of course, on
your opinion in the above.
Sincerely,

/~(
lVu. Justice Stewart

cc: The Conference

,juvrttttt ~and llf tltt ~ttittb ~hdta
'llaaft-htghtn, gl. OJ. 21l~J!.~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

The enclosed is the kind of concurrence
I had in mind in connection with joining Lewis
Powell's approach in Almeida-Sanchez

Copies to:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
J ustice

Douglas
Brennan
Stewart
Marshall
Powell

.§nprl'1tt~ ~onrt of tltc ';tutitdl .§tatcs

:uraglrmgtltn, p. Qi..
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 11, 1973

Re:

\I

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

'

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
The governing test in Fourth Amendment cases is
that of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, post ____ •
The judgment of Cong·ress, the lower courts, and those
administering the immigration laws has uniformly been that
because of

tl::. ~

problems inherent in preventing illegal

entries by aliens, neither warrant nor probable cause should
be required in every case where a vehicle is searched for
aliens either at the border or in areas near thereto.

That

judgment appears sufficiently reasonable to me to agree
without reservation with Parts I and II of .the Court's opinion.
It also raises considerable doubt in my mind with respect to

- 2 the necessity for securing warrants to support stops and
searches by roving border patrols.

But I acquiesce in

and join Part III of the Court's opinion.

·How much

protection the warrant will afford in this context I am
unsure.

But it may prevent some abuses; and, as the Court

points out, searches normally must be supported by warrant.
At the same time, it does not appear to me that requiring
the warrant contemplated by the Court's opinion will place
insuperable obstacles in the way of performing what is
already a difficult job or substantially reduce the authority
of the roving patrol in sens itive areas near the border such
as the one involved here appears to be.

I

/r-Et;;P
ebitAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-6278
Condrado Almeida-Sanchez, On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
Petitioner,
v.
of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
United States.
{ June - , HJ73]

MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL. concurring in the result.
As my views of this case and resolution of the problem
involved differ from those expressed in the opinio11 of
the Court. 1 find it necessary to state these views in som<•
detail. We are confrontPd here with the all too familiar
necessity of reconcilin~ a lC'gitimate 11eed of government
with constitutionally protccteu rights. Then· eall be
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along
thousands of miles of open border valid immi~ratio11 and
related laws. Nor can there be any question as to the
necessity, in our free society, of safeguarding persons
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue
raised by this case is possible with due recognition of both
of these interests. and in a manner compatible with thP
prior decrsions of this Court.'

I
The search here involved was carriC'd out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to the Mexican border. Lt was not a border search ,
nor can it fairly be said to have been a search COil1 I <llU in <lcconJ w1th thr Court 's eouclu~i01.1 thal nothing ill
t, l i. S. C . ~ 1:357 (a) or 111 K CFB 287 .l ~rrvc~ to a11t horizP UJJ
othrrwi,;p IIDrOn~tittJtiona[ HPal'Ch .

·.

71-fl27R-C'ONcrn

2

ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES

ducted at tlw "functional equivalent" of the border.
Nor docs this case involve the constitutional propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points
removed from thr bordrr or its functional equivalent.
Nor, finally. was the 8earch based on caus<' in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge concerning an automobile or its passengers." The question posed. rather, is
whether and under '"hat circumstances the Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in
area 110t far removed from the border for the purpose
of apprehending aliens illegally en tcring or in the country.
The Government has made a convi11cing showing that
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at placrPother than estabLished crosf'ing point~ . that they an· oft<'ll
assistt>d by slllugglcrs. that even thof't' who cross on foot
arP nwt and transported to their destinations by automobiles . and that roving checks of automobiles are thr
only feasible means of apprehending them. It would,
of course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a COilstant patrol along thousands of miles of bordN. Moreover, because 1uany of thesr aliens cross the border on
foot, or at places other than <~stablished checkpoints. it
is simply not possibl<· in mo~t ca:::es for thP Government
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or Att. .answer, reconcil.i.rls
stowed in an automobile is an ailPn illegally in the coun- the obvious needs
try. Thus thP lllagnitudC' of tlw problem is clear. ~--tOf law enforcement
"Tlw Sollr1tor c;enrral ·~ hn<'f 111 thi~ l'ourt ~taH•:,; rxplic1tl~ · that
''We ... do not tak<' the po;:ition that tbP rhr('king; oprration~ nrP
ju:-;tifird brcau~r tlw ofric<'r~ havr prolmblt' Ci!\l~r or t>Vl'll 'ren~onable
:-;u~picion ' to bt>IH'n ' , with rp,.;pt>rt to Paeb \'('hirlt• chrcked, tlwt 11
contain~ an illegal i!IH'll.
Ap:trt from tlw rra~onahlrii<'~" of r~tnbli~h
mc·nt of thr clwrking op<'l'iltiOn 111 thi~ ra"<', then• ~~ notlnng in tlw
rrcord to indicatC' that til(' Border Pntrol oflic<•r,.; had any :-; prciaJ or
particular rrnHon to ~toppet1tionn and t·xamuH• hi~ car" Bnd for ·
thl' Pll11l'd S1n1e~ , pp . \-l- JO •.

with relevant
constitutional
rights, is far less
clear.
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II

<\i

The Government's argument to sustain the search here
is
simply th
was rf'asonablc under the cir'-t
I
cumstances. But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth
'menclment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" is to be rf'ad in conjunction with its command
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause."
Undf'r our cases. both the concept of probable cause and
the requirement of a warrant b<•ar on the reasonableness
Before deciding o a search, though in certain limit0d circumstancE>s..;2....

whether a warrant
is required, I will neither is requirf'~. The problem of ascertaining the
first address the meaning of the pro able cause r0quirement in the conthreshold quest ion text of roving sea chPs of th0 sort conducted lwre is
of whether some fun
asural;?ly assiste by thr Court's opinion in ('amam
tional equivalent
Muuicipal ('ourt, 387 C. S. 523 ( H)('\7 l . on which the
of probable cause
Gov<•rnnwnt rPlies heavily. ThP Court was thrrP con may exist for the
cerned with thP naturr of thP probable cause rf'quiretype of search
ment in the context of searches to identify housing code
conducted in this ~iolations and was persuaded that thr only workablE'
case •
nwthod of <'11 forcemen t was t><'riodic i n~rwction of all
struct u I'<'S

'It is h<'r<' that the probahl!' caul:'t' drbatP it- fo<'used .
for the agency~- decision to conduct an arC'a utspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of
condition in the an•a as a whole. not on its knowledge of couditiotts in each particular building." 3R7
P. S.. at .")3(-i

(

~,, I·~
t'f; li't

Jn concluding that such general knowledge met tlw
probable caus(' requir<'ment under those circumstances.
th<• Court took note of a "long history of judicial and
public acceptance," of the absence of other methods for
vindicaLing tlw publie interest in prPvetlting or abating
dangerous conditions. and of thf' limit<'d invasion of privacy oecasion<'d by inspections which are " twitlwr perff"QI

i1 V~
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is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the
number of persons legally present. While these searches
are not border searches in the conventional sense. they
ar0 incidental to the protection of the border and draw
a large measure of justification from the Government's
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court
"has long distinguished between an automobile and a
home or office.·· Chambers v. Maroney , 3~)0 U.S. 42. 48
(Hl70). As the Government has demonstrated, and as
those i11 the affected areas surely know, it is the automobile which in most cases makes eff('ctive the att('mpts
to smuggle aliens into this country.
The conjunction of these factors- consistent .i uc..licial
approval. absence of a reasonable alternative for the
solution of a serious problem, anrl only a modest intruswn
on those whosE' automobilc8 arP searched- persuades
Ill<' that under appropriate' limiting eircumstances ther0
cTay exist~constitutionally adequat~probablE' cause to
9. \~'Conduct roving vehicular searches in border areaS.

1fT
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to
conduct roving SE'arches doE's not PIHI the inquiry , for
"except in eertain can•fully clefinrd classE's of cases. a
search of privatE' property without propf'r consE'nt is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.·· Camara v. Municipal Court, supra,
387 C. S.. at 528. 52}). I expressed the vif'w last Term
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy df'termination : "Thf' Fourtl: Anwndnwnt does not contemplatE' the executive officers of Governme11t as neutral

•,
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and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi~
bility is to enforce the laws, to in V('stigatc and to prose~
cute . . . . But those charged with this investigative
and prosccutorial duty should not be the sole j udgcs of
when to utilizc constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." United Stales v. Un ·ited States District
Court, 407 P. S. 207.317 (1072). Sec also'"Coolidge v.
Nev..' Hampsh1:re, 403 t'. S. 443. 401 (1071); Chimel v.
California, 395 F. S. 752. 763-764 ( 1060) .
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like
those presented in this case. the Governnwnt relies upon
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions
to the warrant requirement. .-\ hriPf rt'\'i<'w of tlw nature
of cach of thPSl' major exceptioiiS ill111ninates tlw rcle>vant considrrations in the present cas<'. ln Terry v. Ohio,
392 F. S. 1 (1D68). thP Court hclcl that a policeman may
conduct a limited "pat down" search for wpapons when
he has reasonable grounds for bPliPving that criminal
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the ]><•rson
he SParchcs is armed and dang<•rous. ''The :::olP JU~tifi 
cation l for such a I search
. . is tlH• protPction of tlw
poliee officer and others ll('arby . .
:·m2 l ~ at :.W
l\'othing in Terry supports a11 exception to the• warrant
requirement here.
T.

• •

Colonnade Calerinr; Corp. V . United States, :397 e. ~.
7'2 (1970). and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. ~- 311
(1972), on which the Government also relies. both conccnH'U the standards which ~overn inspcetions of the
businef's premises of those with federal licenses to <'ll~age
.in the sale of liquo1', Colonnade, or tlw salP of guns,
Bisu•ell. ln those eases. Congress was held to havP powN
to authorize \Varrantless searches. As the Court stated
ill B is well ·
"When a deaiPr chooses to engage in this J)('rvasivcly
regulated busi1wss and to accept a federal license,

L

..
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he cloPs so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject
to pffectiw inspection ." 406 C . ~-. at 316 .

Colou11ad£' and Hiswell cannot fairly [)(' read to covc>r
cases of present typr. Onr who merely travrls in regions
near the bordrrs of the country can hardly be thought to
haw submitted to inspections in rxchange for a special
perquisite.
Morr closely in point on their facts are the cases illvolving automobile searches. E. fl., Carroll v. United
Btates, 2(17 l'. f-i. 132 ( 1925 l; Chambers v. Maroney,
supra: Coolidge v. X e·w Hampshire, supra. But whik
those cases allow auto1nobilrs to br srarched without a
warrant in certain circumstaiJC'<'S. tlw princ1pal rationale
for this exceptio11 tu tlw warrant clauf'r is tha1 und er
those circmnl"tances "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can bl' quickly mowd out
of thr locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought." Carroll , .. Pniled States, supra, 267 C. ~ ..
at 15:3. The Court today correctly points out that a
warrantl<'SH S<'arch tJnciPr tlH' Carroll line of caPP~ must
he Pupport<'d by probabl<' cau~>r i11 tlH' S<'nse of SJll'Cifie
knowledge about a particular au tomohile. Whlll', as J 11dicated above, my vit>w is that on appropriate facts the
Government can satisfy the probable cause requirement
for a roving S<'arch in a bordPr arra \vi thou t possessing,
information about particular automobiles, it does not
follow that the warrant rPquirrmrnt is inapposit<'. Th<'
very fact that the (;owrnn)('nt's supporting informati<)IJ
rf'latrs to criminal activity in certain areas rathPr thau
to rvidence about a particular automobilP rPnders irrelPvan t the j ustifieation for warrantless searches relied
upo11 in C'arroll and its prog<'ny. Quite simply the roving
RParches arP .i ustified by <'xperirnce with obviously nOll mobile sections of a partieular road or an'a pmbracing
".f'V('ral roads.

71-lt27R-CONCTTH
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None of thr foregoing exceptions to thr warrant requirenwnt, then, applies to roving automobile searches
in border areas. Moreovrr. the propriety of thr warrant procedure here is affirmatively established by
Camara. ~e(' also See \'. City of 8eattle, 387 LT. ~. 541
( H)67). For the reasons outlined above. the Court there
rulrd that probable cau~e could be shown for an area
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented scarchrs. The Court indicated
its general approach to excPptions to thr warrant
rrqu irement :
" In assessing whether thr public interest demands
creation of a general exce ption to the warrant requirement, the question If; not wlwth<'T· the pubhc
interest justifies the type of search in questwn. but
wlwther the authority to se>arch should be evic!Pnced
by a warrant, ;vhich in turn depends in part upon
whetlwr the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the govertJillelltal purpo:::c behmd thl'
sParch .'' :-3g7 LT. ;.\ ., at 5:3:1.
St>e also l'mLed :Stales\'. ('ulled 8Lates !Jistnct Court,
supm, 407 r . S., at :315.
The Government arp:uPs that ('a mara anJ See arr cllstinguishable from the pn'sent case for the purposes of
thr \\'arrant r<'QUirement. lt is true that while a builclmg illSJWCtor who is rpfused adnusswn to a buillllng may
C'asily obtain n warrant to seare h that building. a mcnlber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when
he is refused pcrnussion to inspect an automobile. lt is
also true that the judieial function envisioned in Camara

d,'cJ ,., 0 t Qx-Je,., d

~JiWo~~loll+I'WM't~~w.~"""""~!W.J.i~U~~a.IOQ~~~-l -fo
tJ,61u ~ "the basic agency decision to canvass any arC'a.''

387 l'. ~ .. at 5:32. while' the judicial function here woulrl

peceRsarily include passing on JU~L w<·h a basic dec:isio11

..

o-f

r ~ "Yt ~,e) r Cl ..;, 'u
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But it does not follow from these distinctions that "no
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36.
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it
would not be feasible for the Bordrr Patrol to obtain
advance' judicial approval of th<' decision to conduct
roving S<'arches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable penod of time. " Aecordi11g to the Gowrnment,
the incidenct' of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is predictable. and the roving searches are
apparently planned in advance or carried out according
to a predetf'rmined schedule. The use of au area warrant procedun' would surC' Iy not "frustrate the govPrnmental purpose bC'hind tlH' seareh .
('amara \·. Jiunicipal Court, supra , ;37~ C ~ .. at .1~:3. It \\·ould of
course en tai I somt' iucon venH'IH'P. but 1ncon venH'IlC< ·
alone has nC'ver been thought to bt' an adequate reason
for abrogating the warraut reqmreHl('llt. 8. ()., l 'mted
States \' . ('nited States District ('ourl, supra, 407 C . :-,. ,
at 321.
Although standards fur probablt' cause iu the context
of th1s case are rclatJvC'ly unstructured (cf. Cmted &ates
v. l ' nited States District Court, supra,407 C.~ .. at :32:2).
there arC' a number of relevant factors which would nwnt
COilSideration: they include ( i) the frequency with whiCFi
aliens illegally in the country arc k110Wn or reasonably
beliPvPd to be transported with i11 a particular arC' a;
( i1) the proxuni ty of the area in question to the bordPr ;
(iii) the extensivenf'ss and geographic characteristics of
the arPa, including the roads thrrPin and the C'xtent of
TlwrP 1~ no r('a~on wh~· a .JU(Iiclal oliie<'f' could not <1 pJH'O\'(' whPrP
a ~<'1'1<'~ of rovlllg ~<'nrrlws ovpr thr rours(' of s<'v('ral
da~·" or W('C'b. ExpPnC'JH'<' w1th nntnillnl "Parch or "('riP~ of ~PHrclw~
would lw htghl~ rPIPvant in <'Oilsid<'rillg appltcntwns for rt'JI('WHI of

appropn<~t<•

'I

WHI'r<!lll ,
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their use~he probable degree of interference
\\·ith the rights of inn
persons, taking into account
the ecoJW of the proposed sea
its duration, and the
f-h"<~.~c~a-)~e- @l+a:f'~(*l"+s.i;~~ t;fi. ~1'('-a·rt"

In ~hurt. the drtt'rtni11ation of wlwtlwr a warrant
should be issurd for an area search .involvrs a balancing
of thr legitimatP .interef:ts of law enforcement with protected Fourth Amendment rights. This preseu ts the type
of delicate question of constitutional judgment which
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary rather tha11 the
Executive . Ill the words of Camara ,
"This iH precisely tlw discretion to 1n vade private
property vvhich we have consistently circumscribed
by a requirc•ment that a disinterrsted party warra11t
tlw nec·d to search " :~~7 C . S., at .);~:2-;);3;~.
~or does tlw IIOWlty of the problem posed by rovuJK

SC'arcJws in bordc•r areas undermine the importatteP of a
prior judicial detc•rminatiotl. \Vlwn faepd with a silllilarly unconventiOnal problc•m last Tem1 i11 ( 'niied Stales
/Jistrict Court, supra , \VC rc•cogni zed that the focu s of the
sParch thcr0 involved \o\ai:' " less precii:'P than that dir<"ctPd
aga1nst mort• conventional typt>::; of <'t'llllt' .'' awl that
"I djitfereJJt standards tnay b<• c·ompatibk• w1th th ·
Fourth AnH'tHlment if tlwy an• rca~::onable both in rrlation to the legitimatP need of government . . . and the
protected rill."hts of our citJzens." 407 l '. S., at :322- :323.
Yet we refusC'd to abandon th<' Fourth Amcndnwnt com' l>rpt'tHltllg upon tlw c·tn·um ~tatH' <'~, th<·n· nw~· IH· probable· c·nttH '
for tht• ~rar('h to IH' authon%rd on!~· for a dt':'tgnat('(l portton of ;t
pttritt·Jtlar road 01 :'lt<"h <'illl"t' ma~· t' XJ"t lor a dt':'tgnatrd arPa wln<"h
ma.1· contatn <HIP or mort· road~ or t rark" . l'n rt icularly along much
ol tiH• :\lt•xtt'illl bordt•r, 1 ht•rt• ill'<' \'iit'l an'<J" of uninh<Jbitc•d dP;;nt
nnd and lnnd \\'lllch <JrP lnt\'t•r,;pd by fP\1' , If' nn~· . main rond,; or
htghw;t~ "· but whtch tH'\'t'rt IH'It•"" ma.\· a fl'ord opport unit t(',.;- b.'
l'l t' t \1(' Of I hrn· J ~olatPd rhal'(J('I t•r- for t hr• ,.;mlJgp:l\llg of <tiirll~

concentration of
illegal alien
traffic in relation
to the general
traffic of the road
or area.

...
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mitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is
feasible with due regard to the interests affected.
For the reasons stated above, I think a rational search
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As
no warrant 'vas obtained here, I agree that the judgment
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts
of this particular case.
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PowELL. concurnug 111 the result.

As my views of this case and resolution of the problem
involved differ from those expressed 111 the opinion of
the Court, I find it nec<.>ssary to stat<.> thet>e v1ews in some
detail We are confronted here with the all too familiar
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government
with constitutionally protected rights. There can bf'
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of thf'
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along
thousands of miles of open borclf'l' valirl immigration and
related laws ~or can there be any question as to tlw
necessity, 1n our frc>e ~oc1ety. of safeguarding perso11s
agamst t>earchc>s and se1wres proscrib<'d by th<' Fourth
Amendment
l behevp that a resolutiOn of tlw tSSU<'
raised by this case is possible with due recognitiOn of both
of thesf' intf'rests. and in a mann<'r ~ornpatiblP with the
pnor df'f'iswns of th1s ('nurt ,'

The search here u1volved was carrwd out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi.
mate to the Mexican border [ t was not a border search .
nor can it fairly lw said to have been a search con 1
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ducted at the ''functional eqmva1ent" of the border.
Nor does thts case involve the constitutiOnal propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points
removed from the border or its functional equivalent.
Nor, finally. was the search based on cause 111 the ordinary sense of specific knowledge concerning an automobile or its passengers. " The questiOn posed, rather. Is
whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles lli
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country.
The Government has made a convincing showing that
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places
other than established crossmg points, that they are often
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot
are met and transported to their destwations by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the
only feasible means of apprehending them. [t would ,
of course, be wholly tmpracticable to mamtain a constant patrol along thousands of miles of border. More ~
over, because many of these aliens cross the border on
foot, or at places other than established checkpoints, It
is simply not possible in most cases for the Government
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or
stowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally in the country . Thus the magnitude of th<> prohlem is clear An
"Tlw Sohr1tor Gl'nrml 'H l.lnd 111 thJH Court ~tatl'H l'Xpl1c1tly that
" We ... do not takP the po~1t1on that the rlwckmg opernt1ons ar~
.JUStified beca u::;e t he• uJJicrr~ have proba blr ca u~l' or even 'reasonable
8UspicJOn · to believe, wttb re~pt•ct to each velllCll' clwcked, that 1t
containH an Illegal :thPn Apart from the reasonablene~::; of e::;tablishment of the checking oprrat JOn 1n thus catie, there• ~~ nothing m the
rrcord to indicnte that thr Border Patrol oflicrr~ had any special 01
particular rra~on to ~top prt1t10nrr and rxamme hi" rar." Brief for·
th<· UmtPd Stat<'~ . pp 9-10,

-.
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answer. reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear.

r1
The Government 's argument to sustain the search herr
is simply that it was reasonable under the Circum stances. But 1t ts by now axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" is to be read in conjunctio11 with its command
that "uo Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause."
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause a1H.l
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonable1wss
of a search. though in errtam lim1t0d f'Jre11mstancP~
neither i.ii required
Before deciding whether a warrant IS rPqmred, l will
first address the threshold question of whether some funetional equivalent of probable cause may exist fur the type
of search conducted m this case. The problem of ascertaining the meaning of the probable cause requirement
in the context of roving searches of the sort conducted
here is measurably assisted by the Court 's op11uou 111
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 l'. ~- 523 ( HH:i7). 011
which tht~ Government rehcs heavily . Th(• Court wa::there concerned with the nature• of the probable eaus(·
requirement i.n the context of searches to identify housing
code violatwus and was persuaded that, thC' ouly workable
method of en forcernrn t was JWnochc 1nspectwl1 of all
structures '
"lt, IS here that thC' probable cause debate 1s focused.
for the agency 's decision to COJ1duct an area In spection ts unavoidably based un its appraisal uf
conditions iu the area as a whol(', not on tts knowledge of conditions 111 eaeh part1cular huildinp. ... :i~7
~ ,.. ~ , l:l T

i):ih
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In concluding that such general knowledge met tlw
probable cause req uirrmcnt under those circumstances.
thP Court took not<' of a "lon12: his tory of JUdicial and
public aeePptaJH'<'.·· of tlw abi"C'IIC'<' of othn Jnet hod~' for
vindicating the public in tereHt w pn•vc•n ti11g or abating
dangerous conditions, ami of tlw limited l!lvaswn of pnvacy occaswucd by aclminifltratiw J11S]WCtions which a)'(·
"neithrr pcrsoual 111 natun· nor aimrd at discovery of
evidence of crime." !d., at 5a7
Roving automobile srarclwf' in bordPr rrgwns for alic·n~·.
fikewise, have been consisten Lly approved by the• .1 udJciary. While the question is OJH' of first unprrssion Ill
this Court. such s<'arches UJliformly have bP<'n sustain<•d
by the courts of appeals whose JUI"Isc!IctJoJJ~ Include tllol"'t'
areas of the border lwtween l\llexJco and tlw l'nited ~tat<'~->
where the problem has been mo~t :::c•vere. ~ee. e. y.,
United States v. Miranda, 42() F. 2d 28:-3 (CA9 Hl70);
Roa-Rodriguez v. (luited SLates, 410 F. 2d 1206 (l'AlO
1969). Moreover. as noted above. no alternativr solu-·
tion is reasonably possible
Tlw Governmrnt further arg,nc·~ that l"llch searciH•:,
resemble thosP concluct<'rl in ( 'a111ara 111 tltat thc·.v an·
undertakeu pnmarily for adilllnif'trat JV<' rathc'r tha11
prosecutorial purposes . that their futJrtiOJl i~ simply to
locate those who are illegally lwr<' and to deport them.
Brief for the Pnited ~tate's. p . 28 11. :25. This argumpnt
is supported by the assertion that only :3<;;, of alit'ns
apprehended Ill this country an· prosc•euted. \Vhil<' tlw
low rate of prosecution offers no l!:reat solacr to the
innocent \Vhos<' automobile::: arc' searched or to tlw fpw
who arc prosecuted. 1t does Perw to differentiate th1s
class of searches from random arc'a sParches which arc' 110
more than "fishing expeditions" for evidence to support
prosecutions. The possibility of prospcution doPs not
distinguish such sC'archrf' from those' involwd in Camara.
Despite the Court's assertwn 1n that cas<' that tlw sParclws
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime,'' 387 U. 8.,
at 537, violators of the housing code there were subJect
to criminal penalties. !d., at 523 n. '2.
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these
searches, according to the Governmeut, arc conducted i11
areas where the concentration of illegally-present aliens
is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to tlw
number of persons legally present. While these searchPs
are not border searches in the conventional sense, they
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw
a large measure of justification from the Governmeut 's
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendmellt than
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court
"has long distinguished between att automobile and a
home or office" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48
(1970). As the Governmeut has demonstrated, and as
those in the affected areas surely know, it ts the au tomobile which in most cases makes effectiw thP attemptf'
to smuggle aliens into this couutry
The conjunction of these factors-cous1stent .1 udiCial
approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the
solutiou of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion
on those whose automobiles are searched-persuades
me that under appropriate limiting Circumstances there
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable causP to r.onduct. roving vehir.ular searches in bordPr
areas.
If I
The conclusiOn that there may be probable cause w
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry, for
"pxcept in certain carefully rlefined classes of cases , 8 .

'
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search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' un less it has beeu authorized by a valid
search warrant. " Camara v. Municipal Court. s·upra,
387 U. S., at 528, 529. I expressed the v1ew last Term
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy d<:' ~
termination : "The Fourth Amendment does not con ·
template the executive officers of GovPrnme11t as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. The1r duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to Investigate and to pros<'~
cute .. , . But those charged with this invest1gatiw
and prosecutorial duty should uot be the sole .1 udges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive nieanR iu pursu ing their tasks... United States v. United States Distncl
Court, 407 l l. ~ . 297, 317 ( 1972) . See also ('ool1:dye v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. ~. 443. 491 ( 1971) ; ('himel v
California, 395 U.S. 752,763- 764 (1969) .
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like
those presented 111 this case, the Government relies upon
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exception!:'
to the warrant requirement. A brief review of the natur('
of each of these major exceptions illuminates th e reh·vant considerations in the present casP. ln T erry v Ohio ,
392 U. S. 1 ( 1968), the Court held that a policemail may
conduct a limited "pat dow11" search for weapons when
be has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person
be searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustification [for such a] search . . . IS th(' protection of the
police officer and others nearby
392 U S.. at 29
Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrailt
requirement hen·
Colonnade Cate1"/,ng ('orp . v. (!mted States, 397 U. ~
72 (1970), and nm:tAd 8tates v Biswell, 406 F . S. all
( 1972), on which the Government also relies, both collr.erned the standards which govern inspections of tlw,
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business prcmis('S of those with federal licenses to engage
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or tlw sale of gun .
Biswell. In those rases. ('<mgn'E'S was held to have power
to authorize warrantless SParclws. As the Court stated

in Hiswell
''When a dealer chooses to engage 111 this pervasiv<'ly
regulated busmess and to accept a fl'd('ral license,
he docs so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms. and ammunitiou will be subject
to effective inspection." 40o t '. S .. at ;)Hi

Colonnade and Bisu•ell cannot fairly bP read to eover'
cases of present type. On<' \Vbo merely travels in regions
near the borders of the country can hardly be thought W
have submitted to inspections in Pxchange for a special
perquisite .
More closely 111 point on their facts an' the cases lllvolving automobile searches. E. o. , Carroll "· Uuited
States, 267 U. S. 132 ( 1925) ; Chambers \' Maroney.
supra; Coolidge v. Xett' Hampshire , suprn. But whil<'
those cases allow automobiles to b(' searched without a
warrant in ccrtam circumstancPs. the pri 11ci pal rational!>
for this exception to the warrant claus<' is that undPr
those circumstances "it IS not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which th<> warrant must
be sought." Carroll \' ( 'nited States, supra, 267 l '. :-) .
at 1.13 The Court today correctly points out that 11
warrantle s search under tlw ( 'arroll line of cases must
be supported by probable cause in tlw sense of specific
knowledge about a particular automobile . While , as in
dicated above, my view is that on appropriate facts the•
Government can satisfy tlw probable cause requir<:'ment
for a roving search in a border area without possessing
information about particular automobiles, it does not
follow that. t.h<> warrant requirement is inapposite. The•
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very fact that the Government's supporting information
relates to criminal activity in certain areas rather than
to eviJencc about a particular automo!Jilc renders irrelevaJJt the justificatio11 for warrantless searches relied
upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite s_imply the roving
searches arc justified hy experience with obviously nonm.obilc sections of a particular road or area embracing
several road::>.
None of the foregoing exeeptions to the \\'arra11t requirement, then. applies to rovi11g automobile searches
in border areas. Moreover. the propriety of tlH:~ warrant procedure here is affirmatively Pstablished by
Camara. See abo See v. Cit !J uf 8ealtle, :-3~7 C S. fi41
(1967). For the reasolls outlined above. the Court there'
ruled that probable cause could bL' shown for an area
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated'
its general approach to exceptions to the warrant
requirement :

"In assessing whether the publie inten•st demands
creation of a general <'Xceptio11 to tlw warraut n'quirement. the question is not ,,·hether the public·
wterest justifies the typP of search 111 question. but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant. which in turn depends i11 part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purposP behind tJw
search." :)87 1J. ~-. at .13:-3.
See also United States v_ [1 nited States !Jistn'ct Court,
supra, 407 U. S., at 315.
The Goverume11t argues that ('amara and See are distinguishable from the preseut casr for the purposes of
the warrant requirernent. It is true that while a building inspector who is refused admission to a building may
easily obtain a warrant to sea.reh that building, a mem-
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ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when
he is refused permission to inspect an automobile. It is
also true that the .JUdicial function envisioned in Camara
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agency
decision to canvass any area," 387 U. S., at 53~. while
the judicial function here would necessarily include passing on just such a basic deciswn .
But it does not follow from these d1stwctwns that "no
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible
and meaningful." Bnef for the Umted ~tatrs, at 30.
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that 1t
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain
advance judicial approval of the demswn to couduct
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable period of t1me.' Accordmg to the Government,
the incidence of illegal transportatwn of ahens on certain roads 1s predictable, and the rovwg searches are
apparently planned in advance or carried out according
to a predetermined schedule. The use of an area warrant procedure would surely not "frustrate the governmental purpose behmd the search.
Canw,ra v. Municipal Court, supra, 378 U. :::l., at 533. lt would of
course entail some mconvemence, but wcouvemence
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. y., United
States v ('nited States /Jt~t; nct Co·url, supra, 407 l :---.,
at 321.
Although standards for probable cause in the co11text
of this case are relatively unstructured ( cf. United State~>
v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 322),
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit
There i~ no reason wh~· a Juchcwl olficPr eould not u pprovt> where
appropnate a ~ene~ of roving searcheo over the couroe of several
days or wt>eb. ExpN1ence w1th au imtwl ~earch or seiw~ of search!'~
would be highly fE']PVflllt Ill COll::ilciE'nllg apphcatl011t-i for renewal of
l\ w;trr0ni .
3

" .
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consideration : they mclude ( i) the frequency with which
aliens illegally w the country are known or reasonably
believed to be transported within a particular area ,
( ii) the proximity of the area In question to the border ;
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of
the area, including the roads therein and the extent of
their use,' and (Iv) the probable degree of interference
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account
the scope of the proposed search. its duration, and the
concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the
general traffic of the road or area
In short, the rleterminatwn of whether a warrant
should be issued for an area st~arch mvolves a balanciu~
of the legitimate mterests of law pnforcenwnt with protected Fourth Amendment nghts. This presents the typ<'
of delicate questi011 of constitutional judgment whiCh
ought to be resolved by the Judic1ary rather than the
Executive . In the words of Cam,ara,
"This 1s precisely the discretwn to w vade pn vatt'
property which we hav<' eonsii'tently < ~ ireumseribed
by a reqUirement that a chsm teres ted party warrant
the need to search " :)R7 I' ~ . at. 532- 533
Nor does the novelty ot the problem posed by rovmg
searches in border areas undermine the Importance of a
prior judicial determination . When faced with a sim~
ilarly unconventwnal problem last Term 1n United States
District Court, supra, we recognized that the focus of the
search ther<' in vol v0d wal:' "less prf'rif'<' than that directed
1
Dependmg upon tlw Clf(.' lllll~tant<'~, tiH'l'P may lw probabll' tauw
for the ~earrh tu lw authorized o11iy for a Jt•srp;Hated portwn ut "
particular road or o; uch rHu~t, may ex1~t for n de~rgnated area whrc!J
rna)· contarn onr or more road~ or track~
Particularly along much
oJ the 1\Jexrrml border, tlwrr are va::;t arra~ of unrnhab1ted drHPrt
and flrtd land whtrh are travrr~<·d b)' few , tf an)·, ma rn road~ or
highway~, but wbteh uevrrt lwk~~ may :dford opportunit r P~- Il\
virtt[f:\ of tlt<' tr J~Oiii!f-•d rhnr;~rtPr - for thr ~m1tgglmg oi niH• t t~
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against more conventional types of crime," and that
" [ dj iffere11t standards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government . .. and the
protected rights of our citizens." 407 C. 8., at 322- 323.
Yet we rcfus<>d to abandon thP Fourth Amendment commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this It<
feasible with clue regard to the interests afft~ctecl .
For the reasons stated abOV(', 1 think a rational search
warrant procedure is feasible i11 cases of this kind. As
no warrant was obtained here. I agree that the judgme11t
must be reversed. I express no opimon as to whether
there was probable cause to issue a. warrant on the facts
of this particular cas(' ,
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As my views of this case and resolution of the problem
involved differ from those expressed in the opinion of
the Court. I find it necessary to state these views iu some
detail. We are confronted here with the all too familiar
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government
with constitutionally protected rights. There can be
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along
thousands of miles of open border valid immigration and
related laws. Nor ean there be any question as to the
necessity, in our free society, of safeguarding persons
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment I believe that a resolutiOn of the Issue
raised by this casP is possible with due recognitiOn of both
of these interests. and in a manner f!ompatiblP with the
pnor deCJ:=uon~ of thJ~ Cnurt,'

The search here involved was carried out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to the Mexican border. It was not a border search ,
nor can it fairly be said to have been a. search con 111 accurrl wt11J t lw Court~ eunclu~IOJJ 1hat nothmg in
S C § 1:357 (H) or tn k CFR 2S7 I ~rr·vr~ to authoriZf\ mt
othPrwisP 11 nron~tn 11t10nH I ,.,<~tr·rl-1 ,

' I am
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ducted at the ''functwnal eqmvalent'' of the border.
Nor does this case mvolve the constitutiOnal propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points
removed from the border or Its functional equivalent.
Nor, finally, was the search based 011 cause 111 the ordinary sense of specific knowledge coucernlllg a11 automobile or Its passengers." ThP questwu posed, rather, Is
whether and under what Circumstances the Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct rovlllg sC'arches of automobiles irl
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or m the country.
The Government has made a convlllcing showing that
large numbers of alie11s cross our borders Illegally at places
other than established crossmg points, that they are often
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot
are met and transported to their destwations by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the
only feasible means of apprehending them It would .
of course, be wholly unpracticable to mamtain a constant patrol along thousands of miles of border. More
over, because' many of these aliens cross the border on
foot, or at places other than established checkpoints, It
is simply not possible 111 most cases for the Government
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or
stowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally in the country Thus thP magnitudP of th0 problem is cl0ar An
2 Thf' Solmtor Cencrai 'H Lmet 111 1111~ Court HtatP~ PxphcitJy that
'' Wf' .
do not take the po~Ition that tlw clwckmg operatiOns ar~
JU~tifiecl becau~P the ufiirer:-; haw probable cause ur t•vpn 'reasonablf'
suspicwn · to beheve, w1th re~pPct to each velnch· c!l(>cked, that 1t
contain;; an !llrgal alwn Apart from tlw n·a~onablcnl'~~ of establishment of the checking oprratJOn Ill tim< ca~r. therP ~~ nothmg 111 the
record to ind1cate that thr Border Patrol officrr~ had any Hpecial or
particular rca~on to ~top prtitiOnPr and Pxammr h1~ rar " Brief for
the lln1tecl Stat<'~ . pp ~J- J(l ,

il - (i:z7S--l 'ON('l JH.

answer, reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement,
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear

fl
The Government's argument to sustalll the search herP
is simply that 1t was reasonable under the (arcum
stances. But 1t 1s by tww axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of "uureasouable searches and
seizures'' is to be read iu con.1 unctwn with its command
that "uo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause am!
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness
of a search, though tn rertam hmitPd r'IrcumstallC<'::<
neither 1s reqmred
Before deciding whether a warrant. JS n'quJred. I w1ll
first address the threshold questiOn of whetht'r some functional equivalent of probable caus<• may exist for tlw typP
of search conducted m this case. The problem of ascer taining the meaning of the probable cause reqUirement.
in the context of roving searches of the sort conducted
here> 1s measurably assisted by the Court 's op1mou ttl
Camara v . Municipal Court, 3H7 l ' ~ . 523 ( 1967), 011
which the- U:overnment relies heavtly The l'ourt wa~
there concerned With the natur<' of the probable caw·w
requirement in the context of scarcht's to Identify housmg
code violatwns and was P<'rsuad<~d that the ouly workable
method of enforcemPllt wat' pPrJOdlC tnspectwn ot all
structur('S
' 'It. ts here that the probable cause debate 1s tocused .
for the agency s decision tu conduct au area 111
SJWCtiOu 1s unavoidably based on Its appra1sal of
conditions Jil the area as a wholt', not on 1ts knowlt>dge of conditionR lll each part;JCular building · :1x1
\ ,
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In concluding that such general knowledge met tht·
probable cause requirement under those circumstances.
the Court took note of a "long history of .1 udicial aud
public aceeptancp," of the abi:'('tle<' of otlwr methods for
vindicating the public mterest lll preventing or abating
dangerous conditions, and of the limited lllvaswn of privacy occasioned by administratiw msprctions which ar<'
"neither persoual 111 nature nor auned at discov(•ry of
evidence of crime. " !d., at 537
Roving automobile searches i11 border rcgwm; for aliens ..
likewise, have been consistently approved by the JUlllciary. While the question is one of first impression '"
this Court. such searches uniformly have bef'n sustamed
by the courts of appeals whot'e .JUnsdwtwns 1nclude thost ·
areas of thc> border bPtwren lVJ exwo and the Uuiterl State"
where the problem has been tllot"t st•vere. See, e. y .,
United States v. Miranda , 42(1 F. 2d 283 ( CA9 1H70),
Roa-Rodriguez v. ( lnited Stales, 410 F. 2d 1206 ( CAlO
1969). Moreover, as noted abovf', no alternative solu tion is reasonably possiblf'
The Government further argues that such searches
resemble those conducted in Cauwra til that they are
undertakeu primarily for adlllllllstrati ve rather tha11
prosecutorial purposes, that their functton is simply to
locate those who are illegally here and to deport them .
Brief for the United States, p. 28 n. '25. This arguuwnt
is supported by the assertion that only 3rc of alicus
apprehended in this country are prosecuted. While thv
low rate of prosecution offers no great solace to thP"
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few
who are prosecuted, 1t does serve to differentiate thlti
class of searches from random an-'a searches whiCh arf' no
more than "fishing expeditions " for evidence to support
prosecutions. The possibility of prosecution docs not
distinguish such Ecarches from those involved 111 Ca,m ara.
Despite the Court's assertiOn m that case that the searchPS

;
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime," 387 U. 8.,
at 537, violators of the housing code there were sub.Ject
to criminal penalties. /d., at 523 n. :2.
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that thes€'
searches, accordiug to the Government, are conducted itt
areas where thP concentration of 1llegally-preseut alie11s
is high , both in absolute terms and in proportion to tilt>
number of persons legally present. While these searchPs
are not border searches iu the conventional sense, they
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw
a large measure of justification from the Government 's
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusiw
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than
the search of one's person or of a building. Th1s Court
"has long distingmshed between au automobile and a
home or office" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48
( 1970) . As the Government has demonstrated, and as
those in the affected areas surely know, it is the auto-·
mobile which in most cases make8 effective the attempts
to smuggle aliens into this country
The conJunction of these factors-consistent JUdiCial
approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for tht
solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion
on those whost> automobiles are searched-persuades
me that under appropriate limitmg circumstances there
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border
areas.
Ill

The concluswn that there may be probable cause t.o
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry , for
''pxcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases ll ..

.
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search of pnvate property w1thout proper consent ls
'unreasonable' unless it has beeu authorized by a valid
search warrant." Canwra v. Municipal Court , s·upra.
387 U. 8., at 528, 529. I expressed the view last Term
that the warrant clause reflects an Important policy de~
termination: "The Fourth Amendment does not con template the executive officers of Government as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws. to tnvestigate and to prose~
cute .
But those charged with this 1nvest1gativP
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole .Judges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursu ing their tasks." United States v. United 8tates Distnct
Court, 407 C. ::-;. 297. 317 ( 197:2). tl<'<' also ('oo{?:dye v
New Hampshire, 403 U. 8. 443. 491 ( 1971 l: C'hi·rnel v .
California, 395 U. 8. 752, 763-764 ( 196\-.l J
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like
those presented m this case. the Government relies upon
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions
to the warrant requirement. A brief review of the natur<"'
of each of these major exceptions illuminates the rel(•vant considerations in the preseut casP. I u Terry v Ohio.
392 U . S. 1 (1968). the Court held that a policpma11 may
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when
he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person
he searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustification rfor such a l search
is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby
392 U ~ .. at 29 .
Nothing in Terry supports an exceptiOn to the warrant
requirement herr"
Colonnade Catering Corp . v Umted States, 397 U ::-;,
72 (1970), and United 8taies v Biswell, 406 U. 8. 311
( 1972), on which the Government also relies, both concerned the standards which govern inspections of tbP.
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business premiSes of those with federal licenses to engage
in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the sale of guns,
Biswell . ln those cases, c:;ongress was held to have power
to authorize warrantless searches As thP Court staterl
ill R·iswell ,
"When a dealer chooses to Pngage 111 this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license,
he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms. and ammunition will be subject
to effective inspection ." 40n l ' H.. at 3lfi

Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be read to cover
cases of present type . One who merely travels in regions
near the borders of the country can harrlly be thought to
have submitted t,o tttspections in exchange for a specud
perquJsJtP
More closely 111 pomt on their fact~ are the caset:> 111
volving automobile searches. E . IJ ., Carroll v. United
8tates, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Chambers v Maroney ,
supra; Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra. But whil~~
those cases allow automobiles to be searched without a.
warrant in certalll circumstances, the pnucipal rationale
for this exception to the warrant clause is that undrr
those circumstances "it ts not practicable to secure' a
warrant because' the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must.
be sought.·· ('armll ,. ( ' nited 8tatPs, supra, 267 lJ ~ .
at 1.13 The Court torlay correctly points out that li
warrantless search under thP ('arroll line of cases must
be supported by probable cause in the sense of specific
knowledge about a part1cular automobile While, as ill dicated above , my view is that on appropriate facts the
Government can satisfy the probable cause requirement
for a roving search in a border area without possessin!!
mformation about particular automobiles, it does not
follow that the> warrant rf'quirPment i~ inapposite Tht>
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very fact that the Govermneut's supporting information
relates to crimillal activity in certain areas rather than
to eviJence about a particular automobile renders irrelevant the justificatiou for warrantless searches relied
upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply the roving
searches are justified by experience with obviously nollmobile sectious of a particular road or area embracing
several roads.
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement, then, applies to rovi11g automobile searches
in boruer areas. Moreover. the propriety of the warrant procedure here is affirmatively established by
Camara. See also See v. City of Sealtle, 387 U. S. 541
( 1967). For the reas011s outlined above. the Court there
ruled that probable cause could be show11 for an area
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated
its general approach to exceptions to the warrant
requirement :
"In assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to the warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search 111 question. but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search." 387 U. S., at 533.
See also United States v. United States District Court,
supra, 407 U. S., at 315.
The Government argues that Camara and See are distinguishable from the present case for the purposes of
the warrant requirement. It is true that while a building inspector who is refused admissio11 to a building may
easily obtain a warra11t to search that building, a mem-
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ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when
is refused permissiOn to inspect an automobile. It ts
also true that the JUdicial function P-nviswned in Camara
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agellcy
decision to canvass any area," 387 U. S., at 532, while
the judicial function here would necessarily mclude passing on just such a basic deciswn
But it does not follow from these dJstlllctwns that "no
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible
and meaningful. " Bnef for the Umted ~tates, at 36.
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that tt
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain
advance JUdicial approval of the demswn to conduct
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable penod of tune. ' Accordmg to the Govermne1 1t,
the incidence of Illegal transportatwn of ahens on certain roads 1s predictable, and thP rovmg searches are
apparently planned m advance or earned out accordmg
to a predetermmed schedule. The use of an area war
rant procedure would surely not "frustrate the governmental purpose behllld the search .· Canw,ra v. Mu
mcipa.l Court, .supra, 378 U. ~ .. at 533 . lt would ot
course entml some lllconvemencP , but wconvemenct>
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. y., United
States v r'nitPd 8tatt<.~ /)1,!;/,ru·t ( '<Yurt. 8'Upra, 407 l ~ '
at 321
Although standards for probable cause in the context
of this case are relatively unstructured ( cf. United State~>
v United States Distnct Court, supra, 407 U. 8., at 322),
there are a number of relevant factors which would ment

he

" There ~~ no reasou why a .JLLChcmJ otfict•r could not approvE' wherP.
appropnate a ~ene~ of rov1ng ~Pa rche~ over thC' course of severa 1
days or weeb. Expenence wnh a11 imtwl ~earch or ::.;c>nes of ::.;earche~
would be h1ghly rrlrvant 1n coJl~ldenng application~ for renrwal o(
<\ warr<~.ht ,

il-n2iK-CO:\Cl·n
ALiVIEIDA-SANCHE2 u. lJ:'\JTED ~T :\TE~

10

consiueration: they lllcludc• ( i J the freqtH'IIcy \\'ith \vhich
aliens illegally in tlw country are kno\\'n or reasonably
believed to be transportPcl w1th in a part iru Jar area;
( ii) the proximity of the ar<'a in qu0~tion to the bordl·r ;
{iii) the extensi vcness and geographic characteristics of
the area. iucl uding the roads therein and the extent of
their use,' and ( 1v) the probabl<' dcgre(• of intrrferenc·<·
with the rights uf innoc0nt persons. taking into account
the scope of tlw propo:::ed sc~arch. its duration. and tlw
concentration of illegal alil'll traffi<· in relation tu the
general traffic of the road or an•n
In short. tlw detPrmination of \\'hether a warrant
should be issuPd for a11 area Sl'arch Involves a balancing
of the JegitimatP mt<'n•sts uf Jaw enforCPllfl'llt \Yith protected Fourth Anwnclnwnt rights. Tlus presents the typ<'
of delicate question of t•onstitutional .iudgnwnt wlueh
ought to be resolved hy tlw .J udieiary ratlwr than tlw
Executive. Jn tlw words of Cani(Lru.
11

This IS precise ly tlw discretion tu lllvade pnvat<'
property ,,·hirh \W have eons1sten tly ('ircumsrribl·d
by a requirement that a chsintcrested party \\'arraiJt
the ne<~d to sParch ." :~~~ l' ~ .. at 5:.t !-533
Nor does the novelty ot the pr(lb]em post~d by rovlllg
searches in border area~ undcrmuw tlw tmportance of a
prior judicial determinatiOIJ. Wlwn faced with a sim~
ilarly uncoiivc•ntwnal problem last Tcnn 111 f 'nited ::itatr:::-:
District Court. supra, we rc·cogn iz('d that thl' focus uf tlw
search th<:>r<• involved \\·a:-: "lpss prPcisC' tha11 that dirPcted
'DrpC'ndmg 11pm1 tht· <·Jr<'lllll~tallt't'~, thvn• m:t~ · [)(' probablt· <·au~•·
for thr :;ea rrh to ut• authori~!'d onl~· for a d<'~tgnated portwn u! "
(l!Hticular road or "uch l': lll ~t· ma~ · t'Xl~t for a dv~JgnatC'd <V'<':I ll'htel•
rna~· contain onr or morr road~ or traek~
Partirularly along much
of tlw l\h•xtr:ill boni<-r, t ll<'rl' an· \'a~ t a ·rPa~ of 11nmhahJtl'd df'~t·rt
lllld and land ll'lllrh :J]"(• lril\"t•r~t·d h~· f<'ll'. If :111.\·, lll:llll road~ 01
higlnnt_\ ·~. IJllt ll'htl'h 111'\"(•rt lwll •,-, ma~ :tllord opport I Ill it )(•,;- I"
virtqo of tiH'H i'ol:llt•d ('h:lr:~f·t••r - I'm tilt' 'ilillggiJng "' niH·t•'

/
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against more conventional types of crime," and that
"[djifferent standards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government ... and the
protected rights of our citizens." 407 U. S., at 322- 323.
Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment commitment to the use of search warrants vvhenever this is
feasible with clue regard to the in trrrsts affected.
For the reasons stated above, 1 think a rational search
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As
no warrant was obtained here, I agree that the judgment
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether
there was probable causr to issue a warrant 011 the facts
of this particular case

..-

No. 71-6278
Condrado Almeida-Sanchez,] On Writ of Certiorari to
Petitioner,
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Jus'l'ICE PowELL, concurring in the result

As my views of this ease and resolution of the problem
involved differ from those expressed in the opinion of
the Court , 1 find it n0cessary to state these views m somE>
detail We are confronted her<:> with the all too familiar
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government
w1th constitutionally protected rights. Then' can be
no qucstiou as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the
law enforcemeut problem with respect to enforcing a~ ,
thousands of miles of open border valid immigratior~
~laws. Nor can there be any question as to the
llecessity , in our free society, of safeguarding persons
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. l believf' that a resolution of the 1ssue
raised by this case is possible with due recognition of both
of these interests , and ill a mamwr compatible with the
prior deCisions of this ('ourL '

I
The search here involved was carri0d out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to the Mexican border. 1t was not a border search ,
nor can it fairly be said to have been a search eon>,

' l am rn accord wrth tlw Court'8 cunrlu8iou that nuthinp; itt
l r S C. § 1:157 (a) or tn H CFR 2~7 1 ~Prvf' ~ to a11t horizP au

othrrwr.~p nnron~ ritutJOnal ~<>an · h .
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II
The Government 's argument to sustain the search here
.is simply that the search was reasonable under the circumstances. But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures'' is to be read in conjunction with its commaud
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause."
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause and
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness
of a search, though in certain limited circumstauces,
neither is required . The problem of ascertaining the
meaniug of the probable cause requirement in the context of roving searches of the sort conducted here is
measurably assisted oy the Court's opinion in eam.ara
v. Mun1:cipal C'ourt , 3R7 11. S. 523 (1967) . on which the
Government relies l1Pavily . The Court was then• concerned with the nature of the probable cause requirement in the context of searches to identify housing code
violations and was persuaded that the only workable
method of enforcement was periodir inspection of all
structures ·

" It, is here that the probable cause debate is focused .
for the agency 's decision to conduct an area lllspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of
conditions in the area as a whole. not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular building." 3R7
l '. ~ .. at Fi3(-\,
In concluding that such general knowledge met the ...
probablP causf• requirenwnt under those circumstances.
the Court took note of a "long history of judicial anrl
public acceptance ," IJf the absenc<> of other methodR for
vindicating thP public interest in JWPventing or abating
dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of privary oecasioned by inspPctions which are "nt>ither rwr -

l.:.~.,
J
c2.G-<_,."f... - . '

Jtnf'.
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sonal in nature uor aimed at discovery of evidence of
crime." I d., at 537.
Roving automobi le searches in border regions for aliens,
likewise, have been consistently approved by the judiciary. While the question is one of first impression in
this Court, such searches uniformly have been sustained
by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include those .v.:;_
areas of the border between Mexico and the United States ~
where the problem has been most severe. :::lee, e. g.,
United States v. Miranda, 426 F. 2d 283 (CA9 1970);
.( Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1206 (CAlO
~~,;r II ~ 1969). Moreover, as noterl above, no altPrnativP solu~ •bf"- tion is reasonably possiblP
!;f!...,.,f'.
fJI(~
More troublesome is the problem of determming the )
J-,c..- ~
~---.
Pxtent to which such searches invade the privacy of those ~ --::-?1 ,- ~
s~.,:Je._,.,c.l!!- '
whose automobiles arP sear
..
·
· that only 3o/r
J~
~
awns appre 1en ec in this country are prosecuted. The "Sf'
4l
~·
Government therefore argues that such searches are con-~
-t....- · ·
..
ducted primarily for administrative rather than prose- bt f~
.-~L.~ '
cutorial purposes, that their function is simply to locate -Ht,J'
.r.rthose who are illegally here and to
deport
them
.
Brief
c
for the United States. p. 28 n. 25. While this contention offers no g;reat solace to the innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the fev,· who are prosecuted,
it does serve to differentiate this class of searches from
random area searches which arc no more than "fishing
expeditions" for evidence to support prosecutions. ~ ft-;f
does the possibility of prosecutiou distinguish such
searches from the searches involved in Ca-rnara. DEspite the Court's assertion iu that case that the searches
wpre not "aimed at the discovery of crime, " 387 U. ~-.
at 537, violators of thP housing code there were subject
to criminal penalties. I d .. at fi23 11. ::!.
~ {j;) Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these
(.,V searches, according to th e Government, are conducted in
areafi wiH~ re th e concentration of illegally-present alien~S

II(

J

-_ L-J. [

~

J

J

-:J'
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is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the
number of persons legally present.CVwhile these searches
are not border searches in the conventional sense, they
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw
a large measure of justification from the Government's
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to
the border. 'Finally, and significantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court
"has long distinguished between au automobile and a
home or office." Chambers v. Maro·ney, 399 U.S. 42, 48
( 1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as
those iu the affecteJ areas surely know, it is the au tomobile which in most cases makes effective the attempts
to smuggle aliens into this country.
The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial_,...approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the
solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion on those whosE' automobilE's are searched- persuades
me that under appropriat<' limiting circumstances then'
may exist constitutionally adequate probable cause to
conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas.

Til
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry. for
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant .'' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra,
387 U. S., at 528, 529. I expressed the view last Term
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy determination : "The Fourtt Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral

I

p.J... .:C.

,.
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and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi~
bility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose~
cute . . . . But those charged with this investigative
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." United States v. United Stales District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). See also, Coolidge v .
Ne'w Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 491 (1071); Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752. 763-764 (1969).
To justify warrantless searches in circumsta1fe, like
those presented in this case, the Governnwnt relies upon
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions
to the warrant requirement. A brirf review of the nature
of each of these major exceptions illuminates t lw relevant considerations in the present cas<'. In Terry v. Ohio,
392 F. S. 1 (1968), the Court held that a policeman may
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when
he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the ]Wrsou
he searches is armed and dang<'fous. "The sole JU Ftification l for such a l search .. is the protection of tlH•
police officer and othrrs nearby . . . . · :3n2 F . ~ .. at 2D
Nothing iu Terry supports an exception to the warrant
requirement here.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States , 397 U. S.
72 (1970), and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. :-i. 311
( 1972), on which the Government also relies. both concemed the standards which govern inspections of the
business premises of those with federal licenses to engage
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or the. sale of guns..
Bistuell. In those cases. Congress was held to have power
to authorize \varrantless searches. As the Court stated
iu Hiswell :
''When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
<!§u1at:9 business and to accept a federal license,.

i1 - !i:271-- CONCLJl{
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he does so with the k110wledge that his business
records, firearms, and ammunition will be su b.iect
to effective inspection ." 406 U. S., at 316.

Colonnade and Biswell cauuot fairly be read to cover
cases of present typr. One who mf~rely travels in regions
near the borders of the country can hardly be thought to
have submitted to inspections r;;' exchange for a speciaL
perquisite.
More closely iu point on their facts are the cases involving automobile searches. E. !J., Carroll v. United
States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Charnbers v. Maroney ,
supra; Coolidge v. l\'etu Hampshire, s'upra. But while
those cas<'s allow automobiles to hP searched without a
warrant iu certain circumstanePs. the principal ratiouale
for this Pxception to the warrant elausP is that undPr
those circumstances "it is not pract,icable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the Iocailty or .1 ur1sdwtion in which the warrant must
hP sought." Carroll v. [ 1m:ted States, supra, 267 r . ;-;.,
... at Ih3. 'l'he Court today correctly points out that a
warrantless search under the Carroll li1w of cases must
be f"Upported by probable causP in the sense of specific
k1wwlcdge about a particular automobile. While . as iii dicated above , my view is that on appropriate facts the
Uovernment can satisfy the probable cause requirement
for a roving search in a border area without possessing
Information about particular automobiles. it does not
follow that the warrant reguirPmcnt is inapp'Osite . The
very fact that the Governmpnt's supporting information
rPlates to criminal activit Ill certam areas rather thaiJ
to evidence a out a partieular automobile renders irrPlevan t the j l!Stifieatwn or warrantless searches relied
upon in ('arroll and its progeny. Quite simply the rovin!l; : ;
RParches are justified by Pxperience with obviously non mobile sPrtions of 1-1 partieular road or arPa l?mbracing·
several roads.

-
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No ne of the foregoing ' exceptions to the warran t re~
quireme nt, then, app lies to ·roving automobile searches
in border areas. Moreover, the propriety of the warrant procedure here is affirmatively established by
Camara. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541
(1967). For the reasons outlined above, the Court there
ruled that j)robable cause could be shown for an area
search, but nonetheless required th at a warrant be ob-tamed for unconsented searches. The Court indicated
1ts geueral approach to exceptions to the warrant
t€'quirement :
"Ln assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to thP warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search ill question, but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind thP
search ." 387 U. ;:)., at 533.
8ee also United States v. Unite.d States District Court,
supra, 407 U. ;-;., at 315.
The Government argues that Camara aud See are distinguishable from the present case for the purposes of
the warrant requirement. lt is true that while a buildmg inspector who is refused admission to a building may
easily obtaiu a warrant to search that building, a member of the Border Patrol has no such opportunitY wheu
..he 1s refused permission to inspect an automobile. lt is
also true that the judicial function envisioned in Camara
Pxtended principally to the details of the search rather
than to "the basic agency decision to canvass any area,"
387 U. S., at 532, while the judicial function here would
pece~sarily include passing on .JUst sueh a hasic deQision

71 - f-\378-CONCUR
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But it does not follow from these distinctions that "no
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36.
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtaiu.
advance judicial approval of the decisiOn to conduct
roving sea rches on a particular road or roads for a rca- ,
sonab le penod of time." According to the Government ,
the iucidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are
apparently planned in advance or carried out according
to a predetermined schedu le. The use of an area warrant procedure would surely not ''frustrate the governmental purposP behind the sParch ." Camara \'. Munu:ipal Court, supra, :37H l' . 1'1 ., at 5:)3. lt would of
coursP Pntail some inconvenience, but in_c_o-nv-e-,t-li_e_llc-·palO'ile has never been thought to be an adequate reasou
for abrogatmg the warraut req mremelit. E. g., Ontte:a
States v. Untted States Dtstnct ( 'uurl, s·upra, 407 l' . H.,
at 021
Although standards for probable cause in the context
of this case are relatively unstructured (ef. United States
v. ( ·m:ted States District ('o·urt, supra, 407 U. :::1., at 322).
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit
consideration : they include ( i) the frequency with which
aliens tllegally w the country arc"known or /'eaSOimbly
believed to be transported w1 th Ill a particular area;
¥ )ol..
( ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border ;
~
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of
•'1'------::t::::h==e=a....,r..,ea.'-J__:1 including the roads thPreill and the extent of

-
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· Tlwn• Is no rea~un why a judiciHl oflie<>r co1Ild nut approve whe>re
<t pproprwt<> a ~ene~ of roving ~earclws over tlw couri:iP of i:iC've>ral
day~ or wc•Pb Exprnenre Witli Hn mitinl HParch or HPrie~ of i:iearche~
would bP lnghl~ - rei evant 111 f'On~idPrmg <I pphca t tons for rr'JIE'W<Il of
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their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account
~ the scope of the proposed search, its duration , and the
~
• \.
demo Ta
· 1arac ens 1cs o t e area.'
.
~
n short, the determination of .w et wr a warr~nt
~
.
l
should be issued for an area search mvolves a b~lanctng
.
·,
J
of the legitimatt' interests of law euforcement w1th pro-~
·
';;./
tected Fourth Amendment rights. This presents the type
~
of delicate questiou of constitutional judgment which
~:~
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary r·ather than the
-~=--ff:===u""'-n:""'.=---a-4..&
Executiw . In the words of Camam.
·4_ ~
I
,

Pr-

r

n ·

"This iK precisely the disrrC'tio JJ to invade private
property which we have rousistently circumscribed
by a req mrcmen t that a disinterested party warrant
t,l!e ne<:'d to search " :{87 l '. S., at t>3:Z- 533 .

~ -~

~or

does th<' Jlovelty of the problelll posed by rov.in~
searches in border areas undermine the importance of a
prior judicial determinatio11. When faced with a sim ilarly UJlconventional problem last Tenu in United State:o
Distn:ct Court. supra, we recognized that the focus of tlw
search therr involved was "less precise than that directrd
against more con ventwnal types of crime,' ' and that,
"ldJifferent sta11dards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amepdmen t if they are reasonable both in relaLlon to the legitimate need of government . .. and the
protcetrd rights of our cit1zens." 407 U . ~ .. at 322- 32:3.
Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment com' TkpL'lldlllg upon tlw c·m·um~lnnc·t·~, rh!'l'( ' m:ty IH' prubnblt• L'<l\IH '
for lh(' ~eHrcb to [J(' Httthori~ed uni)· for 11 dC'~1gn11tC'd portron of 11
p:trtJl'tt!ar road or ~ll('h r a t t~t· m11~· ext ~ t lor 11 t lc>~rgnated nrPa winch
ma .1· contam one or more road~ or track~ Partrrularly along much
of t h(• \Jexrcan border, thl'l't' nn' va,:t an'a" of umnhHb tted dt>"Prt
and and land wluch 11rc• t ra vPnwd b)· fL'W , rf any , main road~ or
lughw11y~. but w hreh nrvL·rt Jwlra~ ma~· 11 fford opportuni IJC'H - h,\
l' tr1tJP of t hrrr t ~oi<tted r h ~H':.t C'fPr - J'or tlw ~mugghng o( <tiiC'm· .

~ ·
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mitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is
feasible with due regard to the interests affected.
For the reasons stated above , I think a rational search
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As
no warrant was obtained here, I agree that the judgment
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts
of this particular cas .

' f
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CHAM BERS OF

.JU ST ICE BYRON R. W HI TE

June 11, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for an early look at your proposed circulation in this case.
over the weekend.

I have examined it with some care

My own judgment now is that if the case

is to be reversed -- as it now will be

your opinion

should become the opinion for the Court.

If it proves

necessary to achieve that result, I would recommend that
those of us who preferred affirmance would state our doubts
in a concurring opinion but acquiesce in yours.

Doing so

would ensure a Court opinion, rather than a judgment
supported by differing views.
might otherwise be obscure:

It would also make plain what
that a majority of the Court

would not require probable cause in the traditional sense
for the

issuance of a warrant to search vehicles for aliens

in areas near the border .
The remaining premise for so recommending to my
colleagues is, with all due respect, that requiring an area
warrant in advance is not a matter of great moment.

Camara

-2-

and See were of significance in that they rejected the
Frank v. Maryland limitation of the Fourth Amendment to
strictly criminal contexts and recognized the inherent
flexibility of the concept of probable cause.

The warrant

requirement itself was designed for what was deemed a narrow
class of cases but one the majority thought deserved protection.

Perhaps it did, but based on the feedback I have had

or noted, the impact of this aspect of those cases has not
been impressive.

But whether or not Camara is persuasive

here and independent of that case, your insistence on
warrants is arguably supportable as a hedge against possible
abuses of the roving search in individual cases or areas.
It should not prevent any of the stops and searches that
now occur.

I can live with that as long as it does not make

a difficult task substantially more so or impossible.
Of course, I have not conferred with any of the other
Justices who have joined my circulation.

If they have other

views, I would very likely remain in dissent.
Sincerely,

a}jv~~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

.§nvrttttt <!fonrt ttf tqt ~nittb ~tttftg
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CHAMBERS 01'"

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 11, 197 3

MEMORANDUM TO:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

The enclosed is the kind of concurrence
I

had in mind in connection with joining Lewis

Powell's approach in Almeida-Sanche z
. t1 -

~~- ) ~CvJ

B.R.W.

Copies to:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Douglas
Brennan
Stewart
Marshall
Powell

\
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 11, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

MR. JUSTICE WHITE,

concurring~

The governing test in Fourth Amendment cases is
that of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, post ____ •
The judgment of Congress, the lower ' courts, and those
administering the immigration laws has uniformly been that
because of the problems inherent in preventing illegal
entries by aliens, neither warrant nor probable cause should
be required in every case where a vehicle is searched for
aliens either at the border or in areas near thereto.

That

judgment appears sufficiently reasonable to me to agree
without reservation with Parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
It also raises considerable doubt in my mind with respect to

- 2 the necessity for securing warrants to support stops and
searches by roving border patrols.

But I acquiesce in

and join Part Iii of the Court's opinion.

How mu ch

protection the warrant will afford in this context I am
unsure.

But it may prevent some abuses; and, as the Court

points out, searches normally must b e supported by warrant.
At the same time, it does not appear to me

t

1

1at requiring

the warrant contemplated by the Court's opinion will place
insuperable obstacles in the way of performing what is
already a difficult job or substantially reduce the authority
of the roving patrol in sensitive areas near the border such
as the one involved here appears to be.

June 11, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Banebez v.

u.s.

Dear Petter and Byron:

As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning
to wtsb I bad not written at all

I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought
tt might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be
anUable - as I see them:
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinicms as circulated prior to
today, plus my cc:mcurrence.
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court opinion with .Byron ftlin.g a cc:mcurrence (in wbieb one or more
Justices might join).
- 3. In view of changes made by Petter In his opinion (draft of
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b)
join b<tb his opin1Cil and result, and file my concurrence. •
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is

best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily.
If left entirely to my own persc:mal preference, I would simply

leave my oplnioo as a coocurrence. It was net written as an opinion
*ll iiJ is decided that I should join Petter, I assume he would make 1t
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem.

- 2-

•.

for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper
form for that purpose.
I do not relish being in the positioo of ''taldng away" from any
Justice an optnloo on which he has labored long and well. This 1s
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the higbest respect.
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolutioo that you think is in the
best interests of the Court, althoagb my purely perscmal preference
ta lndlcated above.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart
Mr. Justice White

lfp/ss

.June 11, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v.

u.s.

Dear Potter and Byron:
As the 11man in the middleu in the above case, I am beginning
to wish I had not written at all.

I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought
it mi~t be helpful if I indicated the ''pptions" now available -as I
see them:
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to
today, plus my concurrence.

2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron. his propoeal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more
Justices might join).
3. In view ol changes made by Potter in hls opinion (draft of
6/11), I could(~ join hts result and also flle my concurrence or (b)
joift beth his opinion and result, and file my cooeurrenee.
-

If the two of yoa could reach agreement as to which of these is

best for the Court, I would acquiesce readUy.

:r left entit"Gly to my awn persmal preference,

I am inclined to

prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion
for the Court, and I would have to change It substant!ally to put it in proper
form for that purpose. Moreover, my ccmcurrence goes somewhat beymd
what ts necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, In effect, an

-2-

affirmative answer to the problem. While this is certainly not una10wn
in our opinions, there may be some merit .. espec:ially where the answer
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Court opinion- for
aUirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence.
Perhaps I should add that I do not reliSh being in the ,p osition
of 'taking awayn from any Justice an ophlloo an which be has labored
long and well. This is especially true as to beth of you whom I bold
Jil the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept :m:v; resolution
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although my purely
personal preference is indicated above.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart

fitr. Justice \Vhtte

lfp/ss

JWle 11, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Potter and Byron:
the •·man in the middle"
to wish I had not written at 11.
As

1n the above

case, I am beginning

I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought
it might be helpful if I indicated the '"pptionsu now available .. as I
see them:

1. Adhere to the "line upu and opinions as circulated prior to
today, plus my concurrence.

2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court oplnioo with Byron filing a concurrence (in hich one or more
Justices might join).
- 3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of
6/11), I eould ( ~ join his result and also file my concurrence or (b)
join Wh his opinion and result, and file my concurrence.
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is

st for the Court, I would acquiesce readily.
I left entil"ely to

y own personal preference, I am inclined to

prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion
for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper
oreover, my emeurrence goes somewhat beyond
form for that purpose.
what is necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, in effect, an

-2-

aHtrmative answer to the problem. While this is eertainly not unknown
in our opinions, there may be some merit - especially where the answer
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Coart opinion .. for
affirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence.
Perhaps I should add tbat I do not relish being in the position
of 'taking away" from any Justice an opinion on which he has labored
long and well. This is especially true as to bdh of you whom I hold
in the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept .any resolution
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although 1ny purely
personal preference is indicated above.
Sincerely,

?"tr. Justice stewart
Mr. Justice illite
lfp/ss

June 11, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.
Dear Potter and Byron:
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am begbming
to wish I had not written at all

I will try to meet with b<th of you to discuss this, but thought
it might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be
available - as I see them:
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to
today, plus my concurrence..
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court opinion with 'Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more
Justices might join).
- 3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b)
join beth his opinion and result, and file my concurrence.*
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily.

If left entirely to my own persooal preference, I would simply
leave my opinion as a concurrence. It was net written as an opinion

*

,ts decided that I should join Potter,

I assume he would make it
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem.

- 2for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper
form for that purpose.
I do not relish being in the position of "taking away" from any
Justice an opinion on which he has labored long and well This is
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the highest respect.
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolutioo that you think is in the
best interests of the Court, although my purely persmal preference
ts indicated above.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss

.i>ttprtutt ~ll:Url of t4t 'J!{ni:ttb ~faftg
._asfrittgton, ~. ~· 21lgt.l1.;l
CHAMBERS OF

June 11, 1973

3TICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR.

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.
Dear Potter and Byron:
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning
to wish I had not written at all.
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought
it might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be
available - as I see them:
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to
today, plus my concurrence.
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more
Justices might join).
3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b)
join both his opinion and result, and file my concurrence. *
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is

best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily.
If left entirely to my own personal preference, I would simply
leave my opinion as a concurrence. It was not written as an opinion

*If it is decided that I should join Potter, I assume he would make it
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem.

- 2for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper
form for that purpose.
I do not relish being in the position of "taking away" from any

Justice an opinion on which he has labored long and well. This is
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the highest respect.
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolution that you think is in the
best interests of the Court, although my purely personal preference
is indicated above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart
Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss

,jlt¥ftutt <!fottrl ttf tJrt ~ttitd ,jtatts

jfas!rin:gbm. ~.
CHAMBERS OF
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June 11, 1973

3TICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.
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Dear Potter and Byron:
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning
to wish I had not written at all.
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought
it might be helpful if I indicated the 11 options" now available - as I
see them:

1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to
today, plus my concurrence.
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more
Justices might join).
3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b)
join both his opinion and result, and file my concurrence.
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily.

1f left entirely to my own personal preference, I am inclined to

prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion
for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper
form for that purpose. Moreover, my concurrence goes somewhat beyond
what is necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, in effect, an

- 2 -

affirmative answer to the problem. While this is certainly not unknown
in our opinions, there may be some merit - especially where the answer
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Court opinion - for
affirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence.
Perhaps I should add that I do not relish being in the position
of "taking away" from any Justice an opinion on which he has labored
long and well. This is especially true as to both of you whom I hold
in the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolution
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although my purely
personal preference is indicated above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss

June 12, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Byron:
Althoup,h T nay ns · " arry to interpret for me the precise import
of your parable of l""' "':, 'f' • einf•. caught off base by 95 feet, I take it
that ...~ otter's opinion wi.u now become that of the Court.
As otter 1as su1--:stantially modified his first circulation
(removing most of the language that troubled me), I will now join his
opinion to give him a Court and, of course, file my concurring opinion.
It seems to me that this combination, including your dissent, will afford
the guidance to the Justice Department and others that I was anxious t o
provide.
1 am a bit c ontrite at unwittingly causing you to classify yourself
with AI Bumbry, although on the baseball diamond (at least) I would

still c onsider this quite a c ompliment.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

~u.pumt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Byron:
Having pondered overnight the suggestion contained
in your memorandum of yesterday, that the four of us who
joined in your proposed opinion for the Court in this case
should now join Lewis' opinion, I am inclined against
following it. It seems to me that a sentence or two added
to your proposed opinion, which would now be a dissent,
would make clear that for the four of us Lewis' administrative
warrant solution would be acceptable a fortiori. While I
do not mean to completely shut the door on further discussion,
I agreed with your opinion when you wrote it, I still agree
with it, and would prefer to stick with it.
Sincerely,

Ptlif.Mr. Justice White
Copy to:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

,ju.p-rttnt {!fllltrt cf tqt 'Jttttittlt .itmrs
~asJ:ringtcn. 10.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 12, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S ..

Dear Byron:
Although I may ask Harry to interpret for me the precise import
of your parable of Bumbry's being caught off base by 95 feet, I take it
that Potter's opinion will now become that of the Court.
As Potter has substantially modified his first circulation
(removing most of the language that troubled me), I will now join his
opinion to give him a Court and, of course, file my concurring opinion.
It seems to me that this combination, including your dissent, will afford
the guidance to the Justice Department and others that I was anxious to
provide.
I am a bit contrite at unwittingly causing you to classify yourself
with Al Bumbry, although on the baseball diamond (at least) I would
still consider this quite a compliment.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

,ju:prtmt Qj:oud of t:Jrt ~b- ,jtNftg

11JagJri:nghm. ~. Qj:. 2ll.;t'!.;l
C H A. MBE.RS O F

JUSTICE BYRON F'? WHITE

June 12, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 -Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Lewis:
As you know, I cannot deliver the votes to join
your opinion. I shall, therefore, remain in dissent.
I am reminded of the Orioles-Twins game the other
night. The Orioles were at bat in the third inning, seven
runs behind and with one out. Al Bumbry singled. Coggins
then hit a long drive to left field. Bumbry, who is
lightning-fast, thought the ball would never be caQght and
took off for home plate. He got almost to third before
realizing that Jim Holt in left field had indeed caught
the ball and was rifling it to the infield. Coggins never
got back even to second. He had the distinction of being
out by 95 feet. His manager said it was just bad judgment -- when you are seven runs behind and the play is in
front of you, you have to make sure the ball isn't caught
before taking off for home.
Sincerely,

~~~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

June 12, 1973

No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Potter:
In accord with the exchange of notes between Byron and me,

I now join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart

lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

.®u:.prtmt <.qcttrt cf tqt 'Jllttibb .:§tafts
2Jia:ilfrbrgtcn. IB. <.q. Zll~J.t~
CHAMSERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 15, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

• J

\ ('
..!

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

'·

~up-rttm

(!Jlllttt ltf t4t ~ttittb ~mttg
.,.-agfrhtghm. ![l. <!J. 2Llgt>!-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/

June 15, 1973

Re:

No. 71-6278

-

Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

II r;. 6.
Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference

\
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Xo. 71- G:278
Condradu Alml'ida-Sanchcz. On Writ of ( 'ertiorari to
Petition(•r.
the rnited States Court
V.
of Appeals for the Kiuth
Circuit.
'United States.
;[June 21. 1073]
MH. Ju::>TICE PowELL. concurring.

While I join tiH' opinion of the Court. which sufficiently
establishes that none' of our Fourth Amendment decisions
supports the search conducted in this case. I add this
concurring opinion to elaborate on my views as to the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this context.
We are confronted here with the all too familiar
necessity of reconciling a legitimate ueed of govcmmeut
with constitutionally protected rights. There can be
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along
thousands of miles of open border valid immigration and
related la,vs. Xor can there be a ny question as to the
necessity. in our frt'P society. of safeguarding persons
against S(>arclws and S('izures proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment. I beliPve that a resolution of the issu{'
raised by this caS(' is possible with due recognition of both
of these interests. and in a manner compatible \vith the
prior decisions of this ( 'ourt. 1

I
The search here involved was carried out as part of a
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxiI am Ill aeeord with th(' Court'~ collelu~ioll that uothiug iu
1-1 ll. S.C.§ 1:{57
(a). or in 1-i CFH :2S7.1 ~rrw~ to authorir.P all otlwrwi~<· \lll('Oll~ti
1

§ 2S7 (a) of tlw lmmigrHtioll nlld ;\atiolla!it.'· Act.
tutionnl

~rn rrh ,
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mate to the :VIexican bonkr. lt \\'as not a border search.
nor can it fairly be said to ha V<' been a search conducted at the "functional equivalent" of th<• bord£•r.
Xor do<·s this casr involv<' the constitutional propriety
of searches at permanent or temporary check points
removed from the bordrr or its functional equivalent.
Xor. finally. ,,·as the S!'arch based 011 cause in the ordinary sense of specific kno\\'lrdge conc<'l'lling an autonwbile or its passengers." The questioll posed. rather. is
whether and under \\hat circumstances thr Border Patrol
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country.
The Government has made a convincing showing that
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places
other than established crossing points. that they are often
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot
are met and transported to their destinations by automobiles. and that roving checks of automobiles are the
only feasible means of apprehending them. It would.
of course. be v\·holly impracticable to maintain a constant patrol along thousands of miles of border. Moreover, because many of these aliens cross the border on
foot. or at places other than established checkpoints. it
is simply not possible in most cases for the Government
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding orstowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally ill the coun"Thr Soli('itor Urnc·ral '~ briPf in thi~ Comt ,:tate,: c·xpliC'iti~- that
do uot tak<' tht• po,:ition that thr C'h<'('kiug oprratiou~ arC'
jn~tifird br<·au~r the· ollie('!'~ havt• probaiJI<· cau~<· ur <'Yl'll ·rrn~onnble
tiUtipicion ' to bPiirvP, \\'ith l'<'~p<·rt to Pach Hhiclr chrrk<·d, that it
contains an illrgal alien. Ap:1rt from the n·a~ouabiPtl<':>"' of P~tnbli~h
mrnt of thr rhrcking O]l('l':ltioll i11 thi" <'<N'. thrrP i~ nothing in the
rr<·orcl to indieatr that thr Border l'atrol otti('N~ had all~· ~Jlt'<"ial or
particular rra~on to ~top prtition<'r and ('Xaminr hi~ ear ." Bric·f fof..
the United Statr~ , pp . 9-10 ..

' 'Vi'f' . . .
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try. Thus thC' magnitude of the problem is clear. An
answer. reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear.

II
The Government's argument to sustai11 the search here
is simply that it was reasonable under the circumsta11ces. But it is by no~· axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its command
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upo11 probable cause.''
Under our cases. both the concept of probable cause and
~he requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness
of a search. though in certain limited circumstances
neither is required.
Before deciding whether a warrant is required. I will
first address the threshold question of whether some functional equivalent of probable cause may exist for the type
of search conducted in this case. The problem of ascertaining the meaning of the probable cause requirement
~n the context of roving searches of the sort conducted
here is measurably assisted by the Court's opunon in
(}mnara v. Municipal Court, 387 l'". S. 523 ( 1967). on
'vhich the Government relies hca.vily. The Court was
there concerned with the nature of the probable cause
{equirement in the context of searches to identify housing
code violations and was persuaded that the only workable
method of enforcement was periodic inspection of all
structures:

"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused.
for the agency 's decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of
conditions in the area as a ,.,·hole, not on its knowl~dge of cond,itions in each particular building." 387
U. S., at 536.

lf-6:!i8-COXC'UR
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In concluding that such general knowledge met the
probable cause requirernent under those circumstances.
the Court took note of a "long history of judicial and
public acceptance." of the absence of other methods for
vindicating the public interest in preventing or abating
dangerous conditions. and of the limited invasion of privacy occasioned by administrative inspections which are
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of
evidence of crime." /.d .., at 537.
Roving automobile searches in border regions for aliens.
likewise. have been consisteutly approved by the judiciary. While the question is one of first impression in
this Court. such searches uniformly have been sustained
by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include those
areas of the border between Mexico and the United States
where the problem has been most severe. See, e. g.,
United States v. Miranda, 426 F. 2d 283 ( CA9 1970);
Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1206 (CAlO
1969). Moreover, as noted above. no alternative solution is · reasonably possible.
The Government further argues that such searches
resemble those conducted in Camara in that they are
undertaken primarily for administrative rather tha.n
prosecutorial purposes. that their function is simply to
locate those who are illegally here and to deport them.
Brief for the United States. p. 28 11. 25. This argument
is · supported by the assertion that only 3'/r of aliens
appreheuderl in this country are prosecuted. While the
low rate of prosecution offers no great solace to the
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few
who are prosecuted. it does serve to differentiate this
class of searches from random area searches which are no
more than "fishing expeditions" for evidence to support
prosecutions. The possibility of prosecution does not
distinguish such searches from those in valved in Camara.
Despite the Court's assertion in that case that the searches.

71-li27~COXCCH
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime." 387 U. S..
537, violators of the housing code there were subject
to criminal penalties. !d., at 527 n. 2.
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these
searches. according to the Government. are conducted in
areas ;vhere the concentratio11 of illegally-present aliens
is high. both in absolute terms and in proportion to the
number of persons legally present. While these searches
are not border searches in the conventional sense. they
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw
a large measure of justification from the Government's
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to
the border. Finally. and significantly, these are searches
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or buildiJ\gs. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
Ol) the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court
"has long distinguished between an automobile and a
home or offic~.'' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42. 48
(1970). As the Govemment has demonstrated. and as
those in the affected areas surely know, it is the automobile which in most cases makes effective the attempts
to smuggle aliens into this country.
The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial
approval. absence of a reasonable alternative for the
solution of a serious problem. and only a modest intrusion
on those ,,.,·hose automobiles are searched-persuades
me that under appropriate limiting circumstances there
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border
areas.

~t

III
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry, for
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a.
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search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.' ' Camara v. Afu11iciJ)(ll Court, supra!
387 U. S .. at 5:28. 5:20. 1 expressed the view last Term
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy de~
termination: "The Fourth Amendment does not conw
teinplate the executive officers of Government as neutral
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute . . . . But those charged with this investigative
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." U11ited States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297 , 317 ( 1972). See also Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971); Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752, 763- 764 (1969).
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like
those presented in this case, the Government relies upon
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions
to the warrant requirement. · A brief review of the nature
of each of these major exceptions illuminates the relevant considerations in the present case. In Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). the Court held that a policeman may
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when
he· has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person
he searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustification rfor such a ., search . . . is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby. ·.. ·." 392 U. S.J at 29.
Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant
requirement here.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S.
72 (1970), and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311
(1972), on which the Government also relies. both concerned the standards which govern inspections of the
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business premises of those with federal licenses to engage
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or the sale of guns.
Biswell. In those cases. Congress was held to have power
to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated
in B-is'well:
"When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business ami to accept a federal license.
he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms. and ammunition will be subject
to effective inspection... 406 e. S .. at 316.
Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be read to cover
cases of present type. One who merely travels in regions
near the borders of the cou11try can hardly be thought to
have submitted to inspections in exchange for a special
perquisite.
More closely in point on their facts are the cases involving automobile searches. E. g., Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney,
supra; Coolidge v . .Yew Hampshire, supra. But while
those cases allow automobiles to be searched without a
warrant in certain circumstances. the principal rationale
for this exception to the warrant clause is that under
those circumstances "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the ,,·arrant must.
be sought.'' Carroll \'.United States, supra, 267 'C. S ..
at 153. The Court today correctly points out that a
warrantless search under the Carroll line of cases must
be supported by probable cause in the sense of specific
knO\vledge about a particular automobile. While, as indicated above, my view is that on appropriate facts the
Governmeut can satisfy the probable cause requirement
for a roving search in a border area v,:ithout possessiug
information about particular automobiles. it does not
follow that the warrant requirement is inapposite. The
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very fact that the Government's supporti11g infonnatiou
relates to cri1ninal activity in certain areas rather than
to · eviuence about a particular automobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless searches relied
upon in Carroll and its progeny. quite simply the roving
searches are justified by experience with obviously nonmobile sections of a particular road or area embracillg
several roads.
i\one of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement. then. applies to roving automobile searches
in border areas. Moreover. the propriety of the warrant procedure here is affirmatively established by
Camara. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541
( 1967). For the reasons outlined above, the Court there
ruled that probable cause could be shown for an area
search. but nonetheless required that a. warrant be obtained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated
its geueral approach to exceptions to the warrant.
requirement:
"In assessing whether the public interest demanus
creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's vvarrant requirement. the question is not
whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question. but "·hether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant. which in
turn depends in part upo11 whether the burden of
obtaining a vvan·ant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." 387 U. S.,
at 533.
See also United States v. United States District Court,
supra, 407 U. S .. at 315.
The Government argues that Camara and See a.re distinguishable from the present case for the purposes of
the warrant requirement. It is true that while a building inspector who is refused admission to a building may
easily obtain a warra,.nt to ~Search that building, a mem-
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ber of the Border Patrol has 110 such opportunity \vhcn
he is refused permission to inspect an automobile. It is
also true that the judicial function envisioned i11 Ca'lll.ara
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agency
decision to canvass any area,'' 387 'C. S.. at 532, while
the judicial function here would necessarily include passing on just such a basic decision.
But it does not follov..· from these distinctions that "no
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36.
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain
advance judicial approval of the decision to conduct
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable period of time." According to the Government,
the incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are
apparently planned in advance or carried out according
to a predetermined schedule. The use of an area warrant procedure would surely not "frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. 1lfunicipal Court, supra, 387 'G. S.. at 533. It would of
course entail some inconvenience. but inconvenience
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. (J., United
States \'. United States District Court, supra, 407 U. S ..
at 321.
Although standards for probable cause in the context
of this case arc relatively unstructured ( cf. United States
v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 322).
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit
:J There i~ no rc:1~011 wh~· a judi<'inl offit·Pr rould not approve whcrc
appropriate n ~>eric·~ of roving ~earehe~ O\'Pr tlw eum~c of 8CVC'r:tl
da~·" or wePh. ExpNic•ncE' with Hll initial ~carrh or ~Prie:-: of ~>earcheti
would bc bight~· rclcvant in con~idering application~ for renewal of
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COilsid<>ratioil: tlwy include• ( i) tiH• frequt•ncy with whieh
alirns illegally i11 the c·ouiltry are known or rrasona.bly
l)('lirved to lH' transportc·d witbi11 a particular ar<'a;
(ii) the• proximity of tlw an·a ill quc•stioll to tlw border;
(iii) the· c•xtc·nsi vc•nrss a11d gc•ogra phic characteristics of
thr ar<·a. iiiCluding tlw roads thc•reill a11d thP extent of
thc•ir us<'.' and ( iv) the• probable• dC'grcr of iilterf<'rf'ncc·
with the rights of innocent pe•rsons. takillg into account
tlw scop<' of the proposed search. its duratiO il. alld the
concrntratioil of illegal alic'll tralhe ill n·lation to the
gell<'ral traffic of the road or an•a.
In short. the• determi11ation of whether a warrant
should be issued for an area search involves a balancing
of tlw legitimatt' i11terests of law rnforcement \Vith protected Fourth Amendment rights. This presellts the type
of delicate question of constitutional judgment which
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary rather than the
Executive•. In the \vords of C'amara,
"This is precisely the discretion to in vade private
pro1wrty which we havr consistently circumscribed
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the nf'ed to sc•arch... :-387 e. S .. at 532-5:33.
X or dot's tlw novelty of the problem posed by roving
searches in bordc•r areas undenniiiC' the importance of a
prior .iudicial detC'rmination. Wlwn faced with a similarly unconv<'IItional problem last Term in [ 1nited State:>
District Court, s·upm, we n•cognized that the focus of the
SC'arch thc•r<' involVC'cl was "l<>ss prrcise than that dirf'cted
DPpt·nding upon Ilw l'in·ttm~tatH'I'~, tht•rt• ma~· ll<' probnbll' c·:llt~t·
for tIll' ~t·n n·h to ht• a 11 t ltori;wd on!~· for a dc·~igna t t•d portion of a
pnrtil'ular road or :'llth t·au~t· m;t~ · t•xi~t for n dl'~ignntPd nn•a \\'hic·h
mn~ · rontain otll' or mon• rond~ or trnc·k~. l'arti('ularl~· along ntttl'h
of tht• \fl'xit·nn hordl'r, tht•rt' nl'l' Yn~t an·n~ of uninhnbitt•d dl'~t·rt
nnd nrid lnnd \\'hic·h art' tr:t\'Pr~t·d b~· fl'\\', if nn~·. mnin rond~ or
higll\nt~·~. but \\'hi<"h lll'\Trtlll'lt·~" mn~ · :dford opportunit'iC'::;-b~·
\'il't\tC of t hl'ir i~ol:tl C'd rita 1':1<"1 ('!'- for 1111• ~mug;gling of aliC'n~.
'
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against mon' conventional types of crime." and that
"I d_liffrrent sta ndards may be compatible with the
Fourth "\nwndmcnt if they arc reasonable both i11 relation to thr legitimate ll('C' rl of Government ... and the
protectC'd rights of our citiz<'ns." 407 C S .. at 322-323.
Yet\\'(' rf'fUS<'d to ahalHion the Fourth Amendnwnt commitmPilt to tlw use of search warrants \\'he11ew'r this .is
feasible " ·ith duP rrgard to thC' interests affected.
For tlw reasons stated above. 1 think a rational search
\\·arrant procedun' 1~ feasible .in case8 of this kind. As
no warrant was obtain<'d lwrc . 1 agree that the judgment
must be reV<'rsed. 1 ('Xpress 110 opinion as to whether
then' was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts
of this particular case.
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